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SUMMARY
Understanding the behavior of complex, large-scale, interconnected systems in a
rigorous and structured manner is one of the most pressing scientific and technological
challenges of current times. These systems include, among many others, transporta-
tion and communications systems, smart grids and power grids, financial markets
etc. Failures of these systems can have potentially enormous social, environmental
and financial costs.
In this work, we investigate the failure mechanisms of load-sharing complex sys-
tems. The systems are composed of multiple nodes or components whose failures
are determined based on the interaction of their respective strengths and loads (or
capacity and demand respectively) as well as the ability of a component to share its
load with its neighbors when needed. Each component possesses a specific strength
(capacity) and can be in one of three states: failed, degraded or functioning normally.
The states are determined based on the load (demand) on the component.
We focus on two distinct mechanisms to model the interaction between compo-
nents strengths and loads. The first, a Loss of Strength (LOS) model and the second,
a Customer Service (CS) model. We implement both models on lattice and scale-free
graph network topologies. The failure mechanisms of these two models demonstrate
temporal scaling phenomena, phase transitions and multiple distinct failure modes
excited by extremal dynamics. We find that the resiliency of these models is sensitive
to the underlying network topology. For critical ranges of parameters the models
demonstrate power law and exponential failure patterns.
We find that the failure mechanisms of these models have parallels to failure
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mechanisms of critical infrastructure systems such as congestion in transportation
networks, cascading failure in electrical power grids, creep-rupture in composite struc-
tures, and draw-downs in financial markets. Based on the different variants of failure,






Understanding the behavior of complex, large-scale, interconnected systems in a rig-
orous and structured manner is one of the most pressing scientific and technological
challenges of current times. While individual components of a system may be well un-
derstood and characterized, there is relatively little understanding of neither the long
run time-behavior of large-scale interconnected systems nor the nature of cascading
failures in complex systems. In modern times, these are of immense concern due to
the enormous economic, infrastructure and social costs of complex system failures.
In this work, an attempt is made to understand the failure mechanisms of com-
plex interconnected systems. Of particular interest is characterizing the extremal
dynamics, mechanisms of cascading failure and the degree of damage and time-to-
failure distributions of complex systems. Also of interest is identifying techniques for
mitigating, postponing, and reversing the onset of failure.
A significant body of research has accumulated in recent years in the study of
complex networks. These are networks whose structure is large-scale and dynami-
cally evolving in time [16]. Unlike the traditional research cited in [16], the focus here
is from the perspective of system reliability [84, 11, 65, 72]. The particular emphasis is
on the study of time-to-failure and degree of damage distributions, rather than steady-
state patterns and mean time-to-failure characteristics. A system reliability approach
enables mapping of the time-to-failure distributions to the traditional failure-time
parametric distributions studied in statistical reliability theory [58, 14, 15]. The util-
ity in this approach is the predictive capability acquired in predicting the various
10
failure modes and pertinent distributions of complex systems. Assuming that the
underlying physical mechanisms of failure are correctly identified, selecting a para-
metric distribution effectively provides a means of representing the underlying failure
dynamics of the system and thus significantly reduces the need for experimental data.
1.2 Literature review
The study of the structure and dynamics of complex systems [73, 37, 16] has attracted
a great deal of interest in recent years. These are systems that are composed of a large
number of interconnected components. These systems include but are not limited
to: social networks, chemical and biological systems such as protein, neural and
genetic networks, engineered systems such as the power grid, Internet, transportation
and communication networks etc. The structural analysis of complex systems is
mainly concerned with characterizing the topology of the underlying network, i.e.
the wiring of the components that compose the system. On one hand, characterizing
the topology of the network allows researchers to identify the structural properties
of the network and develop realistic node connectivity models for real networks. On
the other hand, studying the dynamics of complex systems allows one to understand
the collective behavior of the system as it evolves in time. Study of the dynamics of
complex systems relies on capturing the dynamics of individual components and the
dynamical interaction of these components with each other.
The robustness of complex systems to failure in both static and dynamic contexts
has received significant attention in the literature. Failures in terms of static node
or component removals have been studied in [1, 32, 33]. Dynamic failure scenarios
have also been studied in a variety of contexts: capacity constraints and propagating
failures due to shared load [68, 69], cascading failures in power grids [55, 31], jam-
ming transition in air transportation networks [56], and congestion in communication
networks [36, 40].
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From a more theoretical or conceptual perspective of the dynamical evolution of
complex systems, Self-organized criticality (SOC) has been put forth as one explana-
tion for the complexity in nature [5]. SOC describes the dynamics of complex systems
which have a “critical-point” as an attractor [7, 6, 75]. SOC is typically observed in
non-equilibrium dynamical systems with spatial degrees of freedom which naturally
evolve into a self-organized critical-point. These systems possess a key state pa-
rameter, such as density or temperature, which characterizes the underlying generic
and random system. A specific value of density or temperature is associated with
the system at the critical-point. The characteristic signatures of systems exhibit-
ing SOC are: self-similarity, phase transitions, power laws, punctuated equilibria,
universality classes and other signatures. Power laws have been discovered in infor-
mation/communication networks [78, 76, 77, 99, 18], biological systems [51, 50], and
social networks [35, 46, 3, 39, 102]. It has been observed that many real networks
display power law shaped degree distributions, P (k) ∼ Ak−γ [9, 10]. The widespread
observation of power laws has been interpreted as evidence for SOC and edge of chaos
(EOC) [59] phenomena.
However, other authors have provided alternate explanations to how complexity
arises in nature that are at variance with SOC. For example, Carlson and Doyle [20,
21] have proposed Highly Optimized Tolerance (HOT) as an alternative to SOC. HOT
systems are optimized, through natural selection or engineering design, to provide
robust performance at designed-for-uncertainties. In their work, Carlson and Doyle
illustrate several essential characteristics of complexity in nature that are absent in the
SOC framework but present in HOT [20]. For example, like SOC, HOT also produces
power-laws. However, in SOC the power-laws are associated with the critical density,
where as in HOT, power-laws are present for values higher than the critical density.
The mechanisms for producing power-law distributions in HOT are different from the
mechanisms for criticality in SOC.
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Carlson and Doyle [20, 21] cite the Internet as one example in which power laws are
ubiquitous. It is tempting to view the Internet as a collection of independent agents
who adaptively self-organize into a complex state. However, the internal details of the
Internet are highly structured with sophisticated control protocols that are extremely
robust to the main sources of uncertainty. The different layers of the Internet, which
sit one on top of the other, create the illusion of apparent simplicity, which is exactly
the opposite of SOC and EOC. Furthermore, the power-laws of the Internet are
independent of density (which in this case is the congestion level) which can vary
enormously over the network. This suggests that criticality may not be relevant.
Unlike SOC/EOC, where external forces only initiate events and the mechanism
which gives rise to complexity is self-contained, HOT takes into account the fact that
engineering designs are developed and biological systems evolve in a manner which
rewards successful strategies subject to a specific form of external stimulus. Using
HOT states, which are essentially added design configurations to percolation and
sand-pile models, the authors retain maximum yield well beyond the critical point.
To capture the structural properties of complex systems, a natural approach is to
model system connectivity using graph theory [17, 104]. In this case, the nodes of the
graph represent the components of the system and edges represent the wiring of the
system and the interaction of the components with each other. While graph theory
constitutes a natural framework to characterize the structural topology of complex
networks, a simpler and nearly canonical form of a complex system is represented by
Cellular Automata (CA) [106]. Cellular automata consists only of nodes with links
implied implicitly. In cellular automata of complex systems, each node of the network
represents an agent that can be in any one of a finite number of states. At each time
step, the state of the agent is computed based on its previous state and the state of its
neighbors. Cellular Automata is a relatively new simulation approach that simulates
physical processes that are discrete both in time and in space [24]. Broadly, CA can
13
be categorized into two types: deterministic, using deterministic evolution rules and
probabilistic, using probabilistic evolution rules. Cellular Automata has been used
to simulate statistical physical phenomena such as forest fires, urban traffic jams
and flows, growth of dendrite [60], durability of concrete in aggressive environments
[13], multi-pit corrosion [82], wind damage in forest planning [107], rock failures [2],
creep rupture [25], and meso-scale damage evolution in structures [64, 108]. Cellular
automata has also been used in connection to self-organized criticality behavior to
model landslides, forest fires, and earthquakes [97]. In general, cellular automata is
mostly concerned with steady-state patterns and averages properties such as mean
time-to-failure and expected transient time.
A model employing cellular automata techniques, the Universal Failure Model
(UFM), is proposed in [101] to model the failure dynamics of complex systems. The
UFM consists of a large number of components performing a common function. Each
component possesses a specific strength or load capacity and can be in one of three
states: failed, damaged or functioning normally. The states are determined based on
the demand load on the component. If the demand exceeds the capacity or strength
of the component than the component fails and the components load is redistributed
among its neighbors. Utilizing the UFM, specific shapes of distributions for time-to-
failure and cumulative damage (thus making possible the study of cascading failure
mechanisms in complex systems) can be studied, thus enabling a mapping to the
traditional failure-time parametric distributions such as: Log-normal, Weibull, Ex-
ponential, Gamma, Birnbaum-Saunders distributions etc.
1.3 Objectives
The objective of this work is to use the UFM to model failure dynamics of complex
systems. In particular, the object is to identify distinct patterns of failure propagation
as functions of the input parameters.
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First, we will investigate the UFM in a lattice configuration. Later we will relax
our assumption on the lattice network topology and investigate the failure mechanism
of the UFM in a scale-free graph network topology. We will explore different variants
of the UFM; and for reasons to be described in detail in the next chapter, we will refer
to the different flavors of the UFM as the LOS (Loss of Strength) or CS (Customer
Service) model.
Second, we will investigate congestion phenomena in both lattice and scale-free
network setting from the perspective of communication and transportation systems.
We will investigate congestion phenomena in the context of a Customer Service (CS)
model. We will describe in detail the CS model in the next chapter.
With these objective in mind the outline of this thesis is described next.
1.4 Outline
The thesis is organized in the following chapters:
• In chapter II, we introduce the LOS and CS models. We study the failure
mechanisms of both the LOS and CS models on lattice and scale-free graph
network topologies.
• In chapter III, we provide a mathematical treatment of the LOS and CS models.
• In chapter IV, we provide additional discussion of the properties of the LOS
and CS models that were not covered in chapters II and III.
• In chapter V, we extend the LOS and CS models to study practical applications.
We use the LOS model in creep-rupture studies and compare it to the model
proposed by Mahesh and Phoenix [62]. We use the CS model in air traffic
congestion management studies and relate it to the aggregate flow models of
Sridhar et. al. [93]. We conclude by employing the CS model to interpret
15
metropolitan road traffic congestion using metro Atlanta traffic congestion as
an example.
• In chapter VI, we investigate complex systems from a multi-agent system per-
spective. To model the dynamics of individual agents in the system we use
the Dubins vehicle model [38]. This provides a realistic framework to study
congestion phenomena for air transportation systems.
• In chapter VII, we conclude with a summary of our results, contributions and
possible directions for future work.
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CHAPTER II
FAILURE MECHANISMS OF LOAD-SHARING
COMPLEX SYSTEMS
In this chapter we discuss the failure mechanisms of load-sharing complex systems.
Most of the material in this chapter has been published in Physical Review E in [88].
Here we reproduce that material.
2.1 Introduction
In the last decade a significant body of research has accumulated in the study of
complex systems, their structure and dynamics [73, 16]. Static robustness in terms
of node removals have been explored in [1, 32, 33]. But most real networks undergo
dynamic failures where the failure of a single or multiple nodes might trigger cascades
of failure through the network. Dynamical redistribution of flow have been considered
in different real world networks: power grids [55, 31], air transportation networks [56],
and communication networks [36].
Many physical systems fail as their capacity or strength degrades over time under
constant load or load increases over time as strength remains fixed. For example,
loss of strength phenomena is observed in stress-rupture or creep rupture [62], tire
wear, and level of fluid in a hydraulic system [58]; whereas load buildup is commonly
considered in fiber-bundle models on complex systems [66, 54]. Failure occurs when
component load is greater than its strength. Component failure due to overloading
is a serious threat in networks: a single component failure and its subsequent load
redistribution can trigger cascades of failures through the network, ultimately bringing
down the entire system [66, 55].
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On the other hand, many communication and transportation systems exhibit con-
gestion phenomena as data or customer traffic density increases beyond certain thresh-
olds. Congestion or jamming phenomena for critical values of traffic density has been
demonstrated in models of transportation [71, 87, 70] and communication networks
[74, 89, 98]. Traffic flow models for air transportation systems have been explored in
[56, 86, 93]. Congestion in one part of the network has the effect of rerouting traffic
to other parts of the network resulting in slowing down or clogging traffic in the entire
system.
In this work we explore two different models of interaction between component
strength and load to understand the failure mechanisms of complex systems. The
first one is a Loss of Strength (LOS) model where components lose strength over time
following prescribed rules. The second one is a Customer Service (CS) model where
component demand is modeled through customer or data traffic arrival rate. For
both models we investigate the strength-load interaction both at and below critical
loading levels [66, 67]. At critical loading levels and above the entire system abruptly
collapses, which we refer to as the critical state.
First, we describe the general system setup. We implement both models on two
different network topologies: individual components organized in a n × n lattice or
a scale-free (SF) network of n2 components following a power law degree distribution
P (k) ∼ Ak−γ, with exponents 2 < γ < 3. The SF network is constructed using
the Barabási-Albert (BA) algorithm [9, 10]. The BA SF model is a growth and
preferential attachment algorithm where at each iteration step a new node is attached
to “m” existing nodes in the network, where m is a constant input parameter. At the
end of the iteration steps, a scale-free network of average degree 〈k〉 = 2m is obtained.
We generate BA SF networks for m ∈ (2, 4, 6) which results in average degree 〈k〉 ∈
(4, 8, 12). These choices of 〈k〉 cover a range of communication, biological and social
networks in the real world [16]. In both network topologies each component can be
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in one of three possible modes: fully operational, stressed, and failed. We denote by
(i, j) the location of a component in the lattice. For the scale-free configuration we
number the components from 1 to n2. Next we describe the LOS model in the lattice
configuration.
2.2 The LOS model
For the LOS model on a lattice topology each component is initialized with a specific
strength Sij. Component loads Lij are initialized with the same value and during the
simulation are not exogenously varied. If Lij ≤ ηSij, where η ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter
to control strength degradation threshold, then the component is fully operational
and strength does not degrade. If ηSij < Lij ≤ Sij then the component at (i, j) is
considered stressed and loss of strength takes place over time. We consider deter-
ministic loss of strength for components [58]. The components strength degradation
follows the relationship Stij = −αt + St
′
ij where α is the strength degradation rate
parameter, t is the time and St
′
ij denotes the strength at time t = t
′ when component
LOS commences. If Lij > Sij then the component fails and the load is redistributed
equally to the components immediate neighbors in the system. Once a component
fails it is removed from the network.
The objective of the Sij and Lij initializations is to capture the interaction dynam-
ics of component strength and load. The simulations work in the following way, first
all component loads are set to a specific value Lij = L where L ∈ [0.5..4]. During a
simulation L is not exogenously varied. For each load setting L, 30,000 Monte-Carlo
simulations are carried out and Sij is reinitialized for each simulation. To generate
a mix of strong and weak components, Sij is initialized from a real uniform distri-
bution U [6, 10]. To initiate LOS dynamics, for each simulation 4-5 components are
initialized to a stressed mode Lij > ηSij where deterministic loss of strength takes
place. As L is steadily increased, we arrive at critical ranges of L where interactions
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between components Lij and Sij trigger LOS dynamics and load redistributions for
increasingly greater number of components. This allows us to capture the failure
mechanisms of the system. In the simulations t = k∆t with ∆t = 0.1, k = 1..500,
n = 12, η = 0.7 and α = 0.2. The components at the boundary are initialized to very
high strength to prevent failure. Since boundary components do not fail we do not
need to deal with their load redistributions.
In the SF network case each component has neighbors following a power-law degree
distribution. The simulation initializations for LOS SF network model is the same as
the lattice configuration except with n2 = 100 and for each simulation we generate
a BA SF network. Also by construction all components for the LOS model on a SF
network have neighbors so special handling of boundary components is not necessary.
2.3 The CS model
Next we describe the CS model on a lattice configuration. For the CS model we have
taken a “Eulerian” [57] point of view for component flow dynamics as opposed to
the standard “Lagrangian” point of view of our references. Component demand is
modeled as a customer or data arrival rate λ. Although traffic in real communication
networks is non-Poissonian [89, 79], as a first step we follow [86, 74] and model
customer demand as a Poisson process with rate λ. The rate λ is the same for all
components and does not vary during a simulation. Thus the system is in effect
subjected to a uniformly distributed globally varying load. Component capacity is
modeled through a fixed customer departure rate γij. In addition, each component
possesses an associated queue qij for extra storage capacity. At a given time step if λ ≤
γij then the component is fully operational. If λ > γij then the excess demand (λ−γij)
is redistributed to the fully operational neighbors of the component. Excess demand is
transferred sequentially to the neighbors with the largest spare capacity (γij−λ) > 0
where (i, j) denotes the location of the neighbors. If component demand redistribution
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is successful then the component remains fully operational. The component excess
demand redistribution might be partially or completely unsuccessful. In that event,
the remaining excess demand is placed in the queue qij for processing in the next time
step. If the remaining excess demand is placed in qij successfully then the component
at (i, j) is considered stressed. If the remaining excess demand overwhelms qij then
the component is considered congested (failed) as it is not able to service the traffic
demand. Once a component is congested it is taken off the grid.
Similar to the LOS model, we capture the interaction between component capac-
ity and demand for the CS model through critical ranges of λ that trigger demand
redistribution and congestion. In our simulations, component capacities γij are ini-
tialized by sampling from a integer uniform distribution U [8, 12] to generate a mix
of strong and weak components. We run 30,000 Monte-Carlo simulations for each
integer value of λ ∈ [5, 11]. For each simulation the system is initialized with new
capacities γij. Each simulation is run for t = k∆t = 500 time steps where ∆t = 1.
The queue size is set to q = 6 and n = 12. For our ranges of λ the queue essentially
provides components additional time to prevent failure. Boundary components have
queue’s set to large values to prevent component failure and avoid load redistribution.
For the CS model on a SF network we have n2 = 100 and due to circular boundary
conditions special handling of boundary components is not necessary.
Before presenting our results we note a important difference between the CS and
LOS models. In the LOS model, a component’s load redistribution is the final step
before it fails: once LOS dynamics is initiated the component will fail and an attempt
will be made to redistribute its load. In the LOS model a component can undergo, at
most, one load redistribution. In the CS model a component is essentially renewed
through successful excess demand redistribution. The component fails only if the load
redistribution is unsuccessful and the associated component queue qij is overwhelmed.
In the CS model a component can complete multiple excess demand redistributions
21
and remain fully operational.
Another important point is regarding failed component load that is not success-
fully redistributed. In both models we shed the load and consider it lost. This is
common in the context of internet traffic where packets are routinely discarded when
routers are congested [49]. Similarly, power grid substations have mechanisms which
take them offline during capacity/demand imbalances 1.
2.4 Results
Next, we define two quantities measured in the simulations. During each simulation
components fail as the system evolves in time. We denote by ‘TF’ (Terminal Failure)
the number of component failures at the end of a simulation. TF is a measure of the
degree of system failure. We denote by ‘TT’ (Terminal Time) the time step when
the penultimate component failure occurred. TT can be interpreted as the time the
system achieves a pseudo steady-state.
The TF and TT distributions for different values of load initialization for the LOS
model on a lattice configuration are shown in Figs. 1 and 2. At loading L = 0.5
the system is far from critical. At these loading levels component failures are mainly
due to components that were initialized to commence LOS and their subsequent load
redistributions to weak components. At these loading levels the systems are resilient
to chains of cascading failure triggered by load redistribution, this fact is indicated
by Fig. 1(a).
As the initialization load is increased, transition load conditions can be identified
for L = 2, 2.5. The bi-modal distributions in Fig. 1(g), 2(a) resemble bathtub like
curves that are commonly observed in reliability of complex systems [65]. In Fig. 2(a)
half the simulations represent systems with all components failing. The other half
1M.J. Wald, R. Perez-Pena, N. Banerjee, The New York Times, August 16, 2003
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Figure 1: LOS model distributions. TF distributions (left column); TT distributions
(right column).
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Figure 2: LOS model distributions. TF distributions (left column); TT distributions
(right column).
24
represent systems constituting partial component failures. This implies for approxi-
mately 50% of the simulations the system strength topology is such that cascading
chains of load redistributions are triggered which eventually bring down the entire
system. For the other 50% of simulations the system strength topology is strong
enough to withstand the load redistributions thus avoiding a cascading chain of fail-
ures. Transition load settings are similar to ‘tipping points’ or ‘critical thresholds’
[94, 63]. In our simulation framework, at tipping-points systems may or may not,
depending on system strength topology, descend into catastrophic failure.
2.4.1 Scaling phenomena
Recalling that TF represents the degree of system failure for a given simulation, let
T̃F denote “smoothed” versions of TF. T̃F exhibits temporal scaling phenomena for
the LOS model for load values lower than the transition load on both the lattice and
SF networks of 〈k〉 = 12. T̃F is constructed in the following way. Referring to the
TF and TT distributions in Figs. 1 and 2, each point in the TF distribution has a
associated point in the TT distribution. For a particular system loading L, we bin the
TF distribution in groups of 4 in ascending order and denote them by T̃F i with value
set to the minimum TF value in the bin 2. For each bin we find the corresponding
values in the TT distribution and compute their mean, denoted 〈TT 〉i. We illustrate
the temporal scaling phenomena of T̃F in Fig. 3 for different values of loading for
the LOS model in both lattice and SF network configurations. In Fig. 3, T̃F versus
〈TT 〉 is plotted in a log-log scale. Each circle in the figures represents the mean of a
TT distribution conditioned on a T̃F i.
From these figures the following scaling relation is established for loading values
far below the critical load,
2The results still hold if we set the value to the mean or max of the bin. The objective of binning
is to smooth or denoise the data
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(a) Lattice network L = 0.5




















(b) Lattice network L = 1.5


























(c) Scale-Free network L = 0.5, 〈k〉 =
12

























Slope = 1.2 
(d) Scale-Free network L = 1.5, 〈k〉 =
12
Figure 3: T̃F temporal scaling for the LOS model, lattice configuration (top row)
and SF network (bottom row). The plots are on a base 10 log-log scale.
〈TT 〉 = κT̃F
τ
(1)
Table 1 tabulates the numerical values for κ and τ for different values of load.
At low values of load, Figures 3(a) and 3(c), the logarithm of T̃F scales linearly
versus the logarithm of 〈TT 〉. As the initial load setting is increased, a breakpoint
develops and the T̃F ’s separate into two different log-log linear scales, as illustrated
in Figs. 3(b), 3(d). The slopes of the figures indicate the second group of T̃F ’s have
faster transition dynamics to 〈TT 〉 compared to the first T̃F group. Table 1 also
tabulates the break point T̃F when the switch to faster transition dynamics occurs
and the residual error of the data fit.
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2.4.2 Critical behavior
All systems in the LOS lattice configuration undergo complete failure at the critical
load L = 4, as seen in Fig. 2(g) and T̃F is characterized by a first-order phase
transition into the critical state [Fig. 5(a)]. We define the critical load as the load
required for complete system failure, TF = 99 or 100, with probability greater than
0.95. For the LOS model on SF networks the critical load is slightly higher at L = 4.5
for 〈k〉 = 12, L = 5 for 〈k〉 = 8 and L = 5.5 for 〈k〉 = 4. Here we recall that
component strengths are initialized from a real uniform distribution U [6, 10] with
η = 0.7, meaning that for L > 6 × 0.7 = 4.2 a considerable number of components
will be initialized in the stressed mode Lij > ηSij. To induce system failure in LOS
SF networks, with decreasing 〈k〉 more and more components need to be initialized
to commence failure dynamics. The implication is that the LOS model is increasingly
resilient to system failure with decreasing average network connectivity 〈k〉. This
result is in agreement with [1] which demonstrate that scale-free networks are more
resilient to random errors or failure 3 compared to other network topologies.
The TT distribution fit for the LOS model at the critical loads is shown in Fig. 4.
The LOS model on a lattice configuration for L = 4 is shown in Fig. 4(a). In the
lattice configuration the LOS model fits a power law distribution Prob(TT ) = αTT−β
with β = 3.5 and α = 105.9. The LOS model on SF networks with L = 4.5, 〈k〉 = 12
is shown in Fig 4(b). With probability 0.97 the model fits a power law distribution
Prob(TT ) = αTT−β with β = 2.6 and α = 104.2. The LOS model on SF networks
with L = 5, 〈k〉 = 8 is shown in Fig 4(c) and L = 5.5, 〈k〉 = 4 is shown in Fig 4(d).
As can be seen from the figures, at the critical load as average degree 〈k〉 decreases
the TT distributions loose their power-law scaling. Implying, at the critical load, the
3In the literature there is a distinction between errors and attacks. Attacks target specific nodes
where as random nodes are susceptible to errors. In this work we commence LOS dynamics for
random components
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y = − 3.5*x + 5.9
(a) L = 4 LOS Lattice model, Fit to
P (TT ) = αTT−β


























y = − 2.6*x + 4.2
Prob(Front Tail) ≤ 0.97
(b) L = 4.5, 〈k〉 = 12 LOS SF model,
Fit to P (TT ) = αTT−β






















Load = 5.00, <k> = 4
 
 
y= − 4.8x + 7.4
(c) L = 5, 〈k〉 = 8 LOS SF model





















Load = 5.50, <k> = 2
(d) L = 5.5, 〈k〉 = 4 LOS SF model
Figure 4: LOS model TT distributions at the critical load. Note the breakdown in
power law scaling with decreasing average network connectivity.
LOS model loses power-law scale invariance in system failure time distribution with
decreasing average network connectivity 〈k〉.
2.4.3 Phase diagram
The phase diagram of the LOS lattice model is shown in Fig. 5. The LOS lattice
model demonstrates phase diagrams similar to both first-order and second-order phase
transitions. At the critical load L = 4, cascades of load redistributions induce massive
failure causing all systems to fail as shown in Fig. 2(g). The corresponding first-order
phase diagram is shown in Fig. 5(a). The loading at L = 4 is such that cascading
load redistributions induce failure with minimal LOS dynamics. At transition loadings
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(a) First order transition at L = 4





















(b) Second order transition at L = 2
Figure 5: Phase transition of the LOS lattice model
L = 2, systems undergoing complete failure [refer to Figs. 1(g), 2(a)] exhibit second-
order phase transitions as shown in Fig. 5(b). For second-order phase transitions, the
transition to complete system failure is a gradual process involving repetition of LOS
dynamics and load redistributions cascading from one component to the next.
Here we note that first and second-order phase transitions for traffic congestion
in complex networks were also reported in [36, 40]. In [36], the authors show that
by increasing the probability of node congestion (from η̄ = 0.05 to η̄ = 0.95, where
η̄ is a parameter to control node congestion probability) the traffic flow phase dia-
gram switches from second-order to first-order. On the other hand in [40], the first
or second-order phase transitions depend on the particular traffic routing protocol
utilized (shortest-path routing versus traffic-aware routing). In comparison for the
LOS model, by increasing the load from L = 2 to L = 4, the component failure phase
diagram switches from second-order to first-order.
2.4.4 Failure modes and extremal behavior
The TF and TT distributions for the CS model on a lattice configuration are shown
in Fig. 6. The CS model on a SF network demonstrates qualitatively similar distri-
butions. Loadings λ = 6, 7 correspond to transition loadings for these systems. The
multi-modal nature of the TF distributions in Figs. 6(c), 6(e) indicate that multiple
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failure modes are present in the distributions. Multi-modal distributions have been
observed in nature in the eruption of geysers [4] and sizes of ants [103].
To isolate and identify the different failure modes, we filter the TF distributions
based on the capacities of the failed components. Recall that in simulating the CS
model we initialize component capacities from a integer uniform distribution U [8, 12].
In Fig. 7(a) we color code the TF distribution for λ = 6 [Fig. 6(c)] based on the
capacities of the failed components. From Fig. 7(a) the composition of the different
failure modes becomes clear. The TF distribution for λ = 6 is composed of a failure
mode where only components of capacity= 8 fail, a second failure mode where only
components of capacity= (8, 9) fail, a third failure mode where only components of
capacity= (8, 9, 10) fail and so on. Similarly we can filter the TF distribution for
λ = 7.
It is also of interest to understand the dynamics that are exciting the multiple
failure modes for transitions loadings λ = 6, 7. Motivated by Extreme Value Theory
[47, 44] one explanation lies in the demand dynamics. Although the average demand
on the system is λ = 6 or 7; the CS model is sensitive to the extremal behavior of the
demand dynamics. Extremal events have been modeled in areas as diverse as finance
[41] to earthquake characterization [83]. In Fig. 7(b) we plot the extremal behavior of
the demand dynamics as a function of TF for λ = 6. The figure is constructed in the
following way: in Fig. 7(a) for each TF ∈ [1, 100], we first determine the maximum
demand seen by each of the systems in their associated window [0, TT ]. For each TF
∈ [1, 100] we then compute and plot, the mean maximum demand (shown in blue),
the maximum maximum demand (shown in red) and the minimum maximum demand
(shown in green).
In Fig. 7(b) we can clearly observe the staircase like growth trend of mean max-
imum demand as a function of TF and the step function growth of the associated
min/max bounds of maximum demand. It is our opinion the extremal behavior of
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Figure 6: CS model distributions. TF distributions (left column); TT distributions
(right column).
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(a) Multiple failures modes





















(b) Maximum Demand as a function of TF
Figure 7: Extremal behavior of the CS model for λ = 6 (Color Online)
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(a) λ = 11, TT distribution
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Probability plot for Exponential distribution
(b) λ = 11, CS model Fit to P (TT ) = Exp(µ)
Figure 8: CS model TT distribution fit at the critical load
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the demand dynamics 4 in conjunction with the structure of the component capacity
topology is responsible for exciting the multiple distinct failure modes observed in
Fig. 7(a).
For example in Fig. 7 consider the interval TF ∈ [10, 25]; mean maximum demand
in this interval roughly corresponds to around 14 with components of capacity= 8
failing. Noting that the queue size is 6, we can understand why components of
capacity= 8 are being overwhelmed by the mean maximum demand (8 + 6 = 14) in
this interval. However, in addition to the specific sequence and number of extremal
demands, relatively stronger neighborhood capacity topologies are partly responsi-
ble for the left side of the bell shape and relatively weaker neighborhood capacity
topologies are partly responsible for the right side of the bell shape in the interval
TF ∈ [10, 25]. For a specific level and sequence of extremal demand, a relatively
stronger neighborhood capacity topology provides components a greater opportunity
to survive through load sharing. We could construct similar arguments for the other
bell curve like waves in Fig. 7 such as the interval TF ∈ [30, 50] where components of
capacity= (8, 9) are failing and mean maximum demand is approximately 15.
The result in Fig. 7 is similar in spirit to results in [61], where the authors show
using shell models of turbulence that large fluid velocity fluctuations propagating from
shell to shell cause multiscaling in the shell velocity variation distributions. In other
words the velocity variation distribution is composed of two separate regions, the
first due to “small” but “usual” velocity fluctuations and the second due to “large”
but “rare” velocity fluctuations. Comparing to our results in Fig. 7, we can see the
extremal demand dynamics exciting different scales of failure in the TF distribution.
The TT distribution fit for the CS lattice model at the critical load λ = 11 is
shown in Fig. 8. At the critical load the CS model fits a exponential distribution
4The number, size and sequence of extreme demand constitute the extremal behavior of the
demand dynamics.
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Prob(TT ) = 1
µ
e−TT/µ with parameter µ = 19.06 [Fig. 8(b)]. The CS model on SF
networks demonstrates similar results. In communication and transportation appli-
cations M/M/1 queues have arrivals according to Poisson processes and service time
distributions are exponential [12]. Although individual components in the CS model
resemble M/D/1 queues, at critical demand rates the load sharing capability of the CS
model is rendered redundant and the structure of the component capacity topology
causes the system to demonstrate exponential distribution failure times. Here we also
note that exponential and sub-exponential distributions have been widely reported
in financial applications such as draw-downs of the stock market, major currencies
and major financial indices [90, 52]. The relationship between the extremal dynamics
of the CS model and market draw-downs presents an interesting subject for future
investigation.
2.5 Accuracy of Monte Carlo simulations
We simulated LOS and CS models for each parameter setting of L and λ on both
lattice and scale-free network configurations for 30 000 cases. Simulations were con-
ducted on two Intel Pentium 64-bit desktops. For each setting, simulations were
conducted multiple times. Regardless of the desktop used the simulation results were
always identical. Since the results were identical over multiple runs and over different
desktops, we concluded 30 000 cases were a sufficient numbers of runs.
Also we would like to point out, the shapes of the distribution would not change
if the number of runs were increased. Numerical precision of the distributions would
increase from increased number of simulations but qualitatively the shapes would
remain the same. Ultimately, we are analyzing the behavior of the systems.
2.6 Discussion
To summarize, we have used the concept of component strength and load interac-
tion to investigate the failure mechanisms of complex systems utilizing two different
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strength/load interaction models. The LOS model explores strength/load interaction
through a loss of strength mechanism. The CS model explores capacity/demand in-
teraction through customer or data arrival/departure rate mechanism. At low levels
of loading which correspond to lower network utilization, the failure mechanisms in
the LOS model follow predictable trends [Eq. 1 and Fig. 3]. The failures in the sys-
tems can be managed and network resources are sufficiently allocated. The system is
resilient to cascading failure triggered by load redistribution.
At transition loadings or ‘tipping-points’, both models demonstrate increasingly
unpredictable behavior with system volatility and increasing disorder. Systems may
or may not descend into catastrophic failure and extremal dynamics excite multi-
ple failure modes in systems. The results imply that at these loadings the system
resources (characterized by the system strength topology) need to be allocated ap-
propriately to avoid catastrophic failure.
For critical loads system failure is reached through phase transitions. At criticality,
depending on the strength/load interaction mechanism, systems demonstrate power



































































































































































































































































In the previous chapter, we provided a simulation based analysis of the failure mech-
anisms of the LOS and CS models. In this chapter, we provide a mathematical
treatment of the LOS and CS models. First, we analyze the cascading failure mech-
anism of the LOS model. Next, we provide a Markov chain formulation of the CS
model. We conclude by comparing the results of the Markov chain formulation with
the results obtained from the CS model simulations.
3.1 Cascading failure property of the LOS mechanism
We define cascading failure as the failure process where a components failure and
subsequent load redistribution initiates the failure process for it’s neighbor; the neigh-
bor’s failure and subsequent load redistribution initiates the failure process for the
neighbor’s neighbor; and the cycle keeps repeating in this manner.
It is of interest to us to mathematically define the conditions determining the
presence or absence of cascading failure for components possessing LOS dynamics. We
will first investigate these conditions for components in a 1d or chain configuration and
then discuss the extension of our results to lattice and other network configurations.
Consider a 1d or chain arrangement of components where each component can un-
dergo the LOS mechanism as shown in Fig. 9(a). Assume initially the LOS mechanism
is initiated for only one component and the subsequent load redistribution triggers
the neighboring component to commence LOS. Repetition of this process results in a
progression of cascading failures over time. If a component’s load redistribution fails
to initiate a neighbor’s LOS mechanism then the cascading failure process terminates.
We consider two cases, the first where a component at the boundary of the chain
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initiates cascading failure as shown in Fig.9(a). The second is when a component in
the interior of the chain initiates cascading failure as shown in Fig.10(a).
3.1.1 1d cascading failure initiated by a boundary component
Consider Fig. 9, the initial conditions on the components are L1 ≥ µS1 and Li < µSi
for i ∈ [2, 7]. Therefore component 1 commences LOS, fails at a future point in
time and redistributes its load to component 2. If the load redistributions triggers
LOS for component 2 then it too will fail some time later. Subsequently if the load
redistribution from component 2 triggers LOS for component 3 than component 3 will
also fail. If this process keeps repeating a chain of cascading failure results. If at any
time a load redistribution does not trigger LOS for it’s neighbor then the cascading
failure process stops and all nodes downstream survive.
Mathematically we can express the cascading failure conditions for the 1d system
in Fig. 9 as a set of equations shown in Eq. 2. In this equation set, component load
due to redistribution is accounted for in the summation
∑
.
Initial Conditions: L1 ≥ ηS1 and Li < ηSi for i ∈ [2, 7] (2a)
Node 2: Load redistribution from L1, L2 +
1∑
i=1
Li > ηS2 (2b)
Node 3: Load redistribution from L2, L3 +
2∑
i=1
Li > ηS3 (2c)
Node 4: Load redistribution from L3, L4 +
3∑
i=1
Li > ηS4 (2d)
Node 5: Load redistribution from L4, L5 +
4∑
i=1
Li > ηS5 (2e)
Node 6: Load redistribution from L5, L6 +
5∑
i=1
Li > ηS6 (2f)
Node 7: Load redistribution from L6, L7 +
6∑
i=1
Li > ηS7 (2g)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
time
(a) Cascading failure initiated at node 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
time
(b) Node 1 fails. Node 2 commences LOS.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
time
(c) Node 2 fails. Node 3 commences LOS.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
time
(d) Node 3 fails. Node 4 commences LOS.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
time
(e) Node 4 fails. Node 5 commences LOS.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
time
(f) Node 5 fails. Node 6 commences LOS.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
time
(g) Node 6 fails. Node 7 commences LOS.
Figure 9: Cascading failure initiated by a boundary component. Solid nodes indicate
fully operational components. Dashed nodes indicate LOS or Failure. The plots show
the progression of failure in time.
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Eq. 2a defines the initial configuration. Eq. 2b defines the condition for component
2 to fail after component 1 has failed. Eq. 2c defines the condition for component 3
to fail after component 2 has failed and so on.
In equation set 2 if any one of the equations failed to hold then components
downstream of the penultimate load redistribution would not fail. For example, if
Eq. (2d) fails to hold than the cascading failure process terminates and components
4 through 7 would survive.
If the inequalities in Eq. 2 hold sequentially then there is a important observation
regarding the load that is redistributed. In Eq. 2 as cascading failure progresses
from component to component, the load due to redistribution, the load terms in the
summation
∑
, increase sequentially. For example the load due to redistribution in
Eq. 2d is greater than the load due to redistribution in Eq. 2c which in turn is greater
than the load due to redistribution in Eq. 2b. An appropriate analogy here would
be to tidal waves or tsunami’s in nature. As tidal waves approach the shore their
height keeps steadily increasing, similarly as cascading failure progresses the load due
to redistribution keeps steadily increasing.
From these set of equations we observe that, provided knowledge of the distri-
bution of component strength and load, we can a-priori calculate whether cascading
failure will be present or not if any of the components undergo LOS dynamics. We
can also a-priori calculate the number of components that will fail.
To summarize, for failure initiated at a boundary component of a 1d n-component
system, we can write the cascading failure conditions compactly as,
Initial Conditions: L1 ≥ ηS1 and Li < ηSi for i ∈ [2, n] (3a)
Node k: Load redistribution from Lk−1, Lk +
k−1∑
i=1
Li ≥ ηSk for k ∈ [2, n] (3b)
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If Eq. 3b holds sequentially with increasing k then the n-component system will
undergo cascading failure.
3.1.2 1d cascading failure initiated by a interior component
In a similar fashion we can derive the cascading failure conditions for the component
configuration in Fig. 10. Here the initial conditions are given by L4 ≥ ηS4 and
Li < ηSi for i ∈ [1, 7] and i 6= 4. In this case, cascading failure might progress in 2
directions, to the left and right of component 4. After component 4 fails, its load is
redistributed to components 3 and 5 as shown in Fig. 10(b). If components 3 and
5 commence LOS and fail then their load is redistributed to components 2 and 6 as
shown in Fig. 10(c). In Fig. 10 cascading failure is progressing in 2 directions.
4 5 6 7321
timetime
(a) Cascading failure initiated at node 4.
4 5 6 7321
timetime
(b) Node 4 fails. Nodes 3 and 5 commence LOS.
4 5 6 7321
timetime
(c) Nodes 3, 5 fail. Nodes 2 and 6 commence LOS.
4 5 6 7321
timetime
(d) Nodes 2, 6 fails. Node 1 and 7 commence LOS.
Figure 10: Cascading failure initiated by a interior component. Solid nodes indicate
fully operational components. Dashed nodes indicate LOS or Failure. The plots show
the progression of failure in time.
For cascading failure on the right of component 4, the set of equations are given
by Eq. 4. In this equation set, component load due to redistribution is accounted for
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by the terms in the brackets ( ).
Initial Conditions: L4 ≥ ηS4 and Li < ηSi for i ∈ [5, 7] (4a)
Node 5: Load redistribution from L4, L5 + (
L4
2
) > ηS5 (4b)






) > ηS6 (4c)






) > ηS7 (4d)
For cascading failure on the left of component 4, the set of equations are given by
Eq. 5.
Initial Conditions: L4 ≥ ηS4 and Li < ηSi for i ∈ [1, 3] (5a)
Node 3: Load redistribution from L4, L3 + (
L4
2
) > ηS3 (5b)






) > ηS2 (5c)






) > ηS1 (5d)
From the above equations we can derive the mathematical conditions for failure
progression for a 1d n-component system with failure initiated at a interior compo-
nent p,
Initial Conditions:
Lp ≥ ηSp for p ∈ (1, n) and Li < ηSi for i ∈ [1, n] and i 6= p (6a)
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Cascading failure conditions to the right of component p:










) ≥ ηSk for k ∈ [p+ 2, n](6c)
Cascading failure conditions to the left of component p:










) ≥ ηSk for k ∈ [1, p− 2](6e)
3.1.3 Cascading failure in 2d or 3d
From the mathematical equations for cascading failure in 1d, it is clear that the equa-
tions for cascading failure in 2d or 3d can become quite complicated. For example,
in 1d cascading failure might progress in at most 2 directions. However for a 2d lat-
tice configuration, for each component cascading failure might progress in 8 possible
directions. It is clear that the number of paths the cascading failure process might
take for a lattice configuration of components will quickly become countably infinite.
The same argument applies for components arrangement in a graph network.
However, the mathematical equations for 1d cascading failure from the previous
sections provide us adequate insight on the time progression of cascading failure in
systems and provide us a guideline on how to initialize 2d or 3d systems to achieve
desired failure directions and patterns. For example, suppose it is desired to have
failure progression in a particular direction in a 2d system. In this case the system
could be initialized with strengths Sij following a “canyon” topology and the loads
Lij initialized accordingly. The result would be that failure would follow the route
of the canyon. This is similar to a flowing river in a canyon, which only follows the
route dictated by the topology of the canyon.
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From the above discussion it is clear, we can initialize the 2d or 3d system as
appropriate to achieve the desired directions and patterns of failure.
3.2 Markov formulation of the CS model
For networks where components undergo failure through the CS mechanism we can
model the CS mechanism through Discrete Time Markov Chains.
Consider a network where component demand is the same for all component. Let
D be a discrete random variable whose probability mass function (pmf) is given by
pD(i) = P (D = i), where i ∈ (0, 1, 2, 3, ...). For ease of notation for the rest of
the discussion we write D = i as Di. Let C denote the capacity of a particular
component and CLj the capacity of the jth neighbor where j ∈ [1, n] and n is the
number of neighbors of the component. Also let k denote the length of the queue and
q the queue occupancy where q ≤ k.
For ease of derivation let us consider a component which has 2 neighbors as de-
picted in Fig. 11. In the figure, four cases are pointed out. Let us assume for all cases
that queues are unoccupied.
• Case 1) In figure 11(a), the demand on the component is less than or equal it’s
capacity Di ≤ C hence the component does not need to share its load with it’s
neighbors.
• Case 2) In figure 11(b), the demand is greater than the component capacity
D > C but less than the capacity of neighbor’s D ≤ CL1 < CL2.
• Case 3) In figure 11(c), the demand is greater than the component’s capacity
and also the neighbor 1’s capacity Di > C > CL1 but less than the capacity of
neighbor 2 implying load sharing with neighbor 2 is possible but not neighbor 1.
For case 2 and 3, we would like to compute the probability that the neighbor’s
possess sufficient excess capacity and/or the queue k has sufficient vacancy to
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accommodate the excess demand Di − C.
• Case 4) Finally in figure 11(d), the demand is greater than capacity of the com-
ponents and both neighbor’s, in this case we would like to know the probability
that there is enough space in the queue to meet the excess demand.
3.2.1 CS mechanism Markov chain model
From the above discussion we can define 4 states that a component can reside in. Let
Co define the state that the component is able to meet it’s demand without resorting
to load sharing with neighbor’s or utilizing the queue. Let CL denote the state that
the demand is greater than component capacity but the excess demand Di − C is
completely satisfied through load sharing with neighbor’s. Let Bk denote the state
where excess demand is met through a combination of load sharing and utilizing the
queue or purely through utilizing the queue. Finally, let F denote the state where
the excess demand is not met through load sharing and the queue. Note, F is an
absorbing state and component remains in F once it enters F . Figure 12 depicts the
Markov chain model for the CS mechanism.
3.2.1.1 Transition probabilities for state Co
Next, we derive the state transition probabilities. We do this for the general case of n
neighbors. Let S denote the set of the neighbor’s out of n that are available for load
sharing. Let p,determined using equations 7, 8, denote the total number of neighbor’s









1 : ω ∈ S
0 : ω /∈ S
(8)
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(a) D < C












(b) C < D < CL












(c) D > CL












(d) D > CL

















It follows from fig 11(a), if the component is in state Co then it will remain in
state Co with the transition probability:




If Di > C than the component will attempt to share the excess demand with
available neighbors. Assume there are neighbors available with excess capacity who
can fully satisfy the excess demand, this situation is depicted in figure 11(b). In that
case the transition probability from Co to CL is given by equations 10, 11
1. Note
that Eq. 11 is essentially a maximization over the random variable D for the given
constraints.
1We would like to thank Prof. Panagiotis Tsiotras for his comments on mathematical notation
for this problem.
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PCo→CL = P (D − C ≤ (
n∑
ω=1,ω∈S




where the parameter g is the solution to the equation:
g = sup{y : y − C ≤ (
n∑
ω=1,ω∈S
Cω − py)} (11)
s.t.
C < y < CLω |ω∈S
If the component is able to meet excess demand with load sharing then it tran-
sitions to state CL. There might be situations where the excess demand is partially
met through load sharing and the remainder is successfully placed in the queue. In
that case the component transitions to state Bk. Figures 11(c) and 11(d) depict a
possible situation where this might arise. The transition probability from state Co to
Bk is given by the equations 12, 13.
PCo→Bk = P (D − C −
n∑
ω=1,ω∈S




where the parameter f is determined from equation:
f = sup{y : y − C − (
n∑
ω=1,ω∈S
Cω − py) ≤ k} (13)
s.t.
C < y < CLω |ω∈S
Finally there might be situations where load sharing is not possible and the queue
does not have adequate capacity to meet the excess demand. In that case the com-
ponent transitions to state F . Figure 11(d) depicts a possible case when this might
occur. The transition probability from state Co to state F is given by equation 14.
49
PCo→F = P (D − C − (
n∑
ω=1,ω∈S




Here bic denotes the floor function.
3.2.1.2 Transition probabilities for state CL
If the component is in state CL the transition probabilities are given by the equation
set 15.
PCL→Co = PCo→Co
PCL→CL = PCo→CL (15)
PCL→Bk = PCo→Bk
PCL→F = PCo→F
3.2.1.3 Transition probabilities for state Bk
If the component is in state Bk then in computing the transition probabilities we
need to take into account the queue occupancy q (q ≤ k). We assume the component
capacity C > k, the queue capacity. The transition probability from Bk to Co is given
by equation 16.




The transition probability from Bk to CL is given by Eq. 17.
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PBk→CL = P (D − (C − q) ≤ (
n∑
ω=1,ω∈S




where the parameter g is the solution to the equation:
g = sup{y : y − (C − q) ≤ (
n∑
ω=1,ω∈S
Cω − py)} (18)
s.t.
C < y < CLω |ω∈S
The transition probability from Bk to Bk is given by Eq. 19.
PBk→Bk = P (D − (C − q)−
n∑
ω=1,ω∈S




where the parameter f is determined from equation:
f = sup{y : y − (C − q)− (
n∑
ω=1,ω∈S
Cω − py) ≤ k} (20)
s.t.
C < y < CLω |ω∈S
The transition probability from Bk to F is given by Eq. 21.
PBk→F = P (D − (C − q)− (
n∑
ω=1,ω∈S




Here bic denotes the floor function.
Although we derived the transition probabilities for queue occupancy q, we can
derive the transition probabilities for each slot that the queue is occupied. So for a
queue of size k, we can derive 4 ∗ k transition probabilities. In this way we can track
the queue occupancy through its occupancy state. For example if the queue size is
k = 3, we would have states B1, B2, B3 to track its occupancy. This is the preferred
approach when numerically solving the equations for the transition probabilities.
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3.2.1.4 Transition probabilities for state F
State F is an absorbing state. If it is reached than the components remain in state
F with probability 1.
Using these transition probabilities we can construct the discrete time Markov
chain shown in Fig 12.
3.2.2 Absorbing Markov Chains
It is clear from the description of the CS model Markov chain in the previous section
that at high enough demand rates that the Markov chain is an absorbing Markov
chain. In the next sections, we will work out some examples using the equations
developed in the previous section. But before that we will present the equations of
absorbing Markov chains that we will use subsequently. These equations are taken
from the book “Finite Markov Chains” by Kemeny and Snell and specifically from
chapter 3, “Absorbing Markov Chains” published by Springer-Verlag [53].
Let P denote the transition matrix of an absorbing Markov chain with t transient








where Q is a t× t matrix, R is a t× r matrix,M is a r× t zero matrix and Ir is a
r × r identity matrix.
With P partitioned in the above manner we can calculate the fundamental matrix




Qk = (It −Q)−1 (23)
where It is a t× t identity matrix.
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We can then calculate the expected number of steps before being absorbed when
starting in transient state i. This is given by the ith entry of the vector,
t = N1 (24)
where 1 is column vector of all 1s of length t.
Many other properties of absorbing Markov chains can be computed such as the
variance on number of visits, variance on number of steps, transient probabilities,
absorbing probabilities etc. But for our purposes the equations above suffice for now.
3.2.3 Examples
We now demonstrate the CS mechanism Markov chain formulation using 2 simple
examples. The examples provide insight on how the CS mechanism is operating.
3.2.3.1 Example 1
Consider a system composed of 3 components arranged in a ring configuration as
shown in Fig. 13. We label the components as 1, 2 and 3. In this configuration each
node has two neighbors for load sharing. We will derive the transition probability
matrix for component 1. Assume component 1 has capacity C = 5, component 2 has
capacity CL1 = 10 and component 2 has capacity CL2 = 12. The queue size is k = 3.
The demand D is modeled as a discrete uniform random variable with pmf pD(i) =
1
14
with support i ∈ {1, 2, ..14}.
For load sharing purposes we assume component 1 has higher priority then com-
ponent 2 and 3 and component 2 has higher priority then component 3. Also we
assume in deriving the transition probabilities that the queue’s in component 2 and
3 are not occupied.




















Using equations 16 through 21 with q = 1 we derive the following transition








Using equations 16 through 21 with q = 2 we derive the following transition







Using equations 16 through 21 with q = 3 we derive the following transition












0.3571 0.2143 0.0714 0 0.0714 0.2857
0.3571 0.2143 0.0714 0 0.0714 0.2857
0.2857 0.2857 0 0.0714 0 0.3571
0.2143 0.3571 0 0 0.0714 0.3571
0.1429 0.4286 0 0 0.0714 0.3571




Since we have an absorbing Markov chain, we can calculate the fundamental




2.1439 0.7916 0.2097 0.0150 0.2270
1.1439 1.7916 0.2097 0.0150 0.2270
1.0058 0.8007 1.1290 0.0806 0.1452
0.9292 0.8772 0.1290 1.0092 0.2166




We can also calculate the expected number of steps before being absorbed when














Consider a system composed of 3 components arranged in a ring configuration as
shown in Fig. 13. We label the components as 1, 2 and 3. In this configuration each
node has two neighbors for load sharing. Assume component 1 has capacity C = 8,
component 2 has capacity CL1 = 10 and component 3 has capacity CL2 = 12. The




e−λ with support i ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...} with λ = 9. It is clear that component 1
is the weakest member of the ring network and we expect it to fail first.
For load sharing purposes we assume component 1 has higher priority then com-
ponent 2 and 3 and component 2 has higher priority then component 3.
Using equations 9 through 21 we derive the following probability transition ma-
trix for component 1. The states of the Markov chain are given by in sequence
Co, CL, B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6 and F . Here F is the absorbing state. Also we assume
in deriving the transition probabilities that the queue’s in component 2 and 3 are not





0.4557 0.2503 0 0.0970 0 0.0728 0.0504 0.0324 0.0415
0.4557 0.2503 0 0.0970 0 0.0728 0.0504 0.0324 0.0415
0.3239 0.2635 0.1186 0 0.0970 0 0.0728 0.0504 0.0739
0.2068 0.3806 0 0.1186 0 0.0970 0 0.0728 0.1242
0.1157 0.4717 0 0 0.1186 0 0.0970 0 0.1970
0.0550 0.4007 0.1318 0 0 0.1186 0 0.0970 0.1970
0.0212 0.4344 0 0.1318 0 0 0.1186 0 0.2940
0.0062 0.4494 0 0 0.1318 0 0 0.1186 0.2940




Since we have an absorbing Markov chain, we can calculate the fundamental




5.3753 3.5006 0.1269 1.0559 0.0908 0.8490 0.5278 0.5140
4.3753 4.5006 0.1269 1.0559 0.0908 0.8490 0.5278 0.5140
4.0464 3.3724 1.2409 0.8988 0.2107 0.7114 0.5496 0.4960
3.7352 3.3340 0.1197 1.9760 0.0906 0.8011 0.4239 0.5179
3.3602 3.1764 0.0938 0.7963 1.2017 0.6273 0.5136 0.3803
3.2341 3.0759 0.2599 0.7534 0.1034 1.7384 0.3935 0.5002
2.8443 2.8009 0.0835 0.8412 0.0605 0.5586 1.4707 0.3431




We can also calculate the expected number of steps before being absorbed in the
absorbing state F when starting in any of the transient states, Co, CL, B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6.
















Repeating the example but this time with λ = 11, we get the expected number of















3.2.4 Comparison to simulation results
Now let us compare the theoretical results of the 3-node ring Markov chain model
from Example #2 to results obtained from simulating CS model on different network
configurations. For the simulations we consider four types of network configurations:
a 3-node circular 1d ring, a 10-node circular 1d ring, a 144 node 2d lattice and a 100
node scale-free network. The 3-node and 10-node circular ring is the same as Fig. 13
but with 3 and 10 nodes respectively.
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For the last three network configurations, the component capacities are initialized
from a integer uniform distribution U [8, 12]. For the 3-node ring configuration, com-
ponent capacities are set to 8, 10, 12 respectively. These capacity initializations are
similar to the theoretical 3-node ring example. Components with capacity= 8 are
the weakest links in the networks. The queue size is set to k = 6. The 3-node, 10-
node circular ring network and the scale-free network by construction possess circular
boundary conditions. For the lattice, queue size at the boundary is set very high to
ensure components at the boundary do not fail. So for both the lattice and scale-free
network at most 100 nodes can fail. We simulate all four network configurations for
500 time steps and carry out 30,000 Monte Carlo simulations.
In fig. 14 we show the time distributions for the first component failure for the
lattice configuration for λ = 9, 11. Referring to Eq. 30, the first entry in the t9-vector
is 12.04. This is the expected number of time steps before entering the absorbing
state F from state Co. Co is the initial state of a component with queue empty. In
the simulations for the lattice configuration at λ = 9, we obtained a mean time to
first failure of 7.8. This is shown in fig. 14(a).
Similarly, referring to Eq. 31, the first entry in the t11-vector is 4.004. This is
the expected number of time steps before entering the absorbing state from state Co,
which is the initial state of a component with buffer empty. In the simulations for
lattice configuration at λ = 11, we obtained a mean time to initial failure of 3.25.
This is shown in fig. 14(b).
In table 2 we tabulate for different values of λ, the mean time to first component
failure for the four different network configurations obtained from simulations. We
also tabulate the mean time to first component failure predicted by the 3-node ring
markov chain model from Example #2. The theoretical and simulation results ap-
pear to be in good agreement. As λ increases the error between the theoretical and
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Time to initial failure vs Frequency
λ = 9
Mean time to first failure = 7.8
(a) λ = 9









Time to initial failure vs Frequency
λ = 11
Mean time to first failure = 3.25
(b) λ = 11
Figure 14: Time to first component failure out of 100 components for the CS model
simulation results decreases. Also the simulations feature a greater number of com-
ponents, so as expected, the mean time to first component failure in the simulations
is of lower magnitude then the theoretical predictions.
In table 2 we observe that there is some difference in results between the 3-node
Markov chain and 3-node simulation model. The difference in results between the 3-
node Markov chain and the 3-node ring simulation model can be accounted for by the
fact, that in the computing the transition probability matrix for the theoretical model
we did not take into account the queue occupancy of neighbors. In calculating the
transition matrix, we assumed that neighbors queue were empty. We only took into
account the actual capacity of the neighbors and their difference with the demand.
This approximation was chosen because the number of states in the transition matrix
increases greatly if the queue occupancy of neighbors is taken into account. However,
even with this approximation, the agreement between the 3-node ring Markov chain
















































































































































































































































































LOAD SHARING, PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIA AND
FAILURE PROGRESSION CHARACTERISTICS
In this chapter we will extend our discussion of the CS and LOS extremal models to
include additional properties and dynamics that were not discussed in the previous
chapters. First, we will describe in more detail the load sharing properties of the
CS model. Next, we will discuss SOC signatures of the CS model by drawing an
analogy with the SOC signatures of the Bak-Sneppen evolution model. Finally, we
will conclude the chapter with a discussion on the failure progression dynamics of the
LOS model. We will show that failure progression of the LOS model is composed
of different scales of failure progression. We will also show that the switch in the
scales of failure progression can be reliably captured using ‘change-pont’ detection
algorithms.
4.1 Renewal through load sharing for the CS model
Previously we have commented on the differences between the load sharing properties
of the CS and LOS models. In the LOS model, a component’s load redistribution is the
final step before it fails. Once LOS dynamics is initiated the component will fail at a
later point in time and on failure will attempt to redistribute its load to its neighbors.
In the LOS model a component can undergo, at most, one load redistribution. In
the CS model a component is essentially renewed through successful excess demand
redistribution. The component fails only if the load redistribution is unsuccessful and
the associated component queue qij is overwhelmed. In the CS model a component
can complete multiple excess demand redistributions and remain fully operational. In
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this section we will analyze the load sharing properties of the CS model for a deeper
understanding of the system dynamics.
In Fig. 15 we plot the load redistributions of the CS model for λ = 6. The plots
are constructed in the following way. Each component in the CS model is initialized
with capacity from a uniform distribution U [8, 12]. In a simulation, for components of
a specific capacity, we compute the total number of load redistributions completed by
the components collectively. We do this for all 30,000 Monte Carlo simulations. Next,
for components of a specific capacity, for each TF ∈ [0, 100] we sum the total number
of load redistributions completed by the components. We do this for all components
that failed and also for components that failed or survived. In Fig. 15(a) we plot the
total load redistributions for components of capacity= 8 as function of TF in blue.
We also plot in red,the total load redistributions for components of capacity= 8 that
failed as a function of TF. We repeat this process for components of capacity= 9
in Fig. 15(b), for components of capacity= 10 in Fig. 15(c) and for components of
capacity= 11 in Fig. 15(d). Similarly the load redistribution plots for λ = 7 are shown
in Fig. 16.
From Figs. 15 and 16 the renewal nature of the CS model load sharing becomes
clear. For example, consider Fig. 15(c). In the figure we observe that up to TF=50,
components of capacity= 10 complete large number of load redistributions but do not
fail. From approximately TF=50 onwards we see that large number of components of
capacity=10 complete load redistributions but at some point in time they fail. This is
because from TF=50 onwards the extremal demand dynamics overwhelms the com-
ponents. Nevertheless below TF=50, the components are able to renew themselves
through load sharing and survive. Similar observations and analysis are possible for
all the load sharing plots in Figs. 15 and 16, thus making clear the renewal nature
of CS model load sharing.
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All capacity 8 components
Failed capacity 8 components
(a) Capacity = 8

























All capacity 9 components
Failed capacity 9 components
(b) Capacity = 9


























All capacity 10 components
Failed capacity 10 components
(c) Capacity = 10
























All capacity 11 components
Failed capacity 11 components
(d) Capacity = 11
Figure 15: Load sharing for λ = 6
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All capacity 8 components
Failed capacity 8 components
(a) Capacity = 8


























All capacity 9 components
Failed capacity 9 components
(b) Capacity = 9


























All capacity 10 components
Failed capacity 10 components
(c) Capacity = 10

























All capacity 11 components
Failed capacity 11 components
(d) Capacity = 11
Figure 16: Load sharing for λ = 7
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4.2 Extremal dynamics of the CS model
In chapter II we have illustrated the extremal dynamics of the CS model for λ =
6. Now we present the extremal dynamics of the CS model for λ = 7 in Fig. 17.
Similar to the steps we took for λ = 6, we filter the TF distributions based on the
capacities of the failed components to isolate and identify the different failure modes.
In Fig. 17(a) we color code the TF distribution for λ = 7 [Fig. 6(e)] based on the
capacities of the failed components. From Fig. 17(a) the composition of the different
failure modes becomes clear. The TF distribution for λ = 7 is composed of a failure
mode where only components of capacity= 8 fail, a second failure mode where only
components of capacity= (8, 9) fail, a third failure mode where only components of
capacity= (8, 9, 10) fail and so on.
Similar to our findings for λ = 6, the CS model for λ = 7 is sensitive to the ex-
tremal behavior of the demand dynamics. The number, size and sequence of extreme
demand constitute the extremal behavior of the demand dynamics. In Fig. 17(b) we
plot the extremal behavior of the demand dynamics as a function of TF for λ = 7.
The figure is constructed in the following way: in Fig. 17(a) for each TF ∈ [1, 100],
we first determine the maximum demand seen by each of the systems in their asso-
ciated window [0, TT ]. For each TF ∈ [1, 100] we then compute and plot, the mean
maximum demand (shown in blue), the maximum maximum demand (shown in red)
and the minimum maximum demand (shown in green).
In Fig. 17(b) we can clearly observe the staircase like growth trend of mean max-
imum demand as a function of TF and the step function growth of the associated
min/max bounds of maximum demand. The extremal behavior of the demand dy-
namics in conjunction with the structure of the component capacity topology is re-
sponsible for exciting the multiple distinct failure modes observed in Fig. 17(a).
As an example in Fig. 17 consider the interval TF ∈ [30, 50]; mean maximum de-
mand in this interval roughly corresponds to around 15 with components of capacity=
67





















(a) Multiple failures modes






















(b) Maximum Demand as a function of TF
Figure 17: Extremal behavior of the CS model for λ = 7 (Color Online)
68
8, 9 failing. Noting that the queue size is 6, we can understand why components of
capacity= 8, 9 are being overwhelmed by the mean maximum demand (9+6 = 15) in
this interval. However, in addition to the specific sequence and number of extremal
demands, relatively stronger neighborhood capacity topologies are partly responsi-
ble for the left side of the bell shape and relatively weaker neighborhood capacity
topologies are partly responsible for the right side of the bell shape in the interval
TF ∈ [30, 50]. For a specific level and sequence of extremal demand, a relatively
stronger neighborhood capacity topology provides components a greater opportunity
to survive through load sharing. We could construct similar arguments for the other
bell curve like waves in Fig. 17 such as the interval TF ∈ [50, 70] where components
of capacity= (8, 9, 10) are failing and mean maximum demand is approximately 16.
4.3 Comparison of the extremal dynamics of the CS model
and the Bak-Sneppen evolution model
In this section we describe a self-organized critical (SOC) signature of the CS model.
We do this by first presenting the SOC signature of the Bak-Sneppen evolution model.
We then draw an analogy between the SOC signature of the Bak-Sneppen model and
the extremal dynamics of the CS model. Through this exercise we establish the SOC
behavior of the CS model.
The Bak-Sneppen evolution model is a self-organized critical (SOC) model dis-
cussed in detail in [6, 75]. Here we would like to discuss the similarity between the
self-organization of the Bak-Sneppen model to the critical state and the extremal dy-
namics of the CS model. In the Bak-Sneppen evolution model, independent random
numbers fi are assigned to each site of a d-dimensional lattice of linear size L. The fi
are chosen from a uniform distribution U [0, 1]. At each update step, the site with the
smallest random number fmin is located. This site is the extremal site. That site and
its 2d nearest neighbors are then assigned new random numbers drawn from the same
uniform distribution, such that the new random numbers are greater than the current
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minimum fmin, fi > fmin. Thereafter in the next update step, the new fmin in the
system is located. After many update steps the system reaches a statistically station-
ary state in which the density of random numbers in the system vanishes for f < fc
and is uniform above fc. In the thermodynamic limit L → ∞, no random number
with f > fc is ever the extremal site [75]. In one dimension, all the random numbers
in the system have values above the self-organized threshold fc = 0.66702± 0.00003.
To follow the transient process of the Bak-Sneppen evolution model, [75] tracks
the value of the minimal random fmin as a function of sequential time s. Fig. 18(b)
shows the signal fmin as a function of s during the transient process. In the figure,
the staircase like solid line is an envelope function that tracks the increasing peaks
in fmin. The solid staircase line is computed in the following way. At time 0, the
first minimum value fmin(0) is identified. By definition there are no random numbers
smaller than fmin(0) in the system. The quantity fmin(0) is defined to be the initial
gap, G in the distribution of f ’s, i.e. G(0) = fmin(0). After s updates, a larger gap
G(s) > G(0) opens up, i.e. the new minimum fmin(s) is larger then the previous
minimum fmin(s − 1). The current gap G(s) is the maximum of all the minimum
random numbers chosen, fmin(s
′), for all 0 ≤ s′ ≤ s. In Fig. 18(b) the solid staircase
line shows the gap G(s) as a stepwise increasing function of s. As shown in [75],
clearly when the gap jumps to a new higher value for fmin, there are no sites in the
system with random numbers less than the gap. Since the random numbers are chosen
from a flat distribution P (f), all the random numbers in the systems are uniformly
distributed in the interval [G(s), 1] at the moments in time when the gap jumps. The
gap function G(s) is tracking the evolution of the system to its statistically stationary
state fc.
Based on the above SOC signature of the Bak-Sneppen evolution model, we are
now in a position to draw an analogy to the CS model extremal dynamics. In
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(a) Maximum Demand as a function of TF for
λ = 6
(b) Extremal dynamics of the Bak-Sneppen evolution
model reproduced from [75]. Value of the extremal
signal fmin as a function of s during the transient in a
small (L = 20) one-dimensional evolution model. The
full line shows the gap G(s) as a step-wise increasing
function of s. The gap is an envelope function that
tracks the peaks in fmin.
Figure 18: Comparison of extremal dynamics of CS model with the Bak-Sneppen
evolution model
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Fig. 18(a) the CS model extremal dynamics for λ = 6 is shown again. The con-
struction of the figure was explained in detail in chapter II. In Fig. 18(a) as the
system organizes into its critical state of TF = 100, we observe the staircase like step
functions of mean maximum demand (in blue), maximum maximum demand (in red)
and minimum maximum demand (in green). These functions are also developing as
an envelope function similar to the envelope function G(s) in Fig. 18(b).
Fig. 18(a) demonstrates a clear link between the degree of system self organization,
characterized by TF, and the extremal dynamics of maximum demand. For the
class of systems we are studying using CS model dynamics for λ = 6, the path to
the SOC state characterized by TF, demonstrates behavior similar to punctuated
equilibria. In punctuated equilibrium models such as the Bak-Sneppen evolution
model, the system evolves to the critical state, not in a slow and steady path, but in
bursts of activity that are separated by long periods of little activity in terms of the
evolution of species. In Fig. 18(a), the punctuated equilibriums correspond to the TF
values. These TF values are reached through the corresponding extremal dynamics
of maximum demand which occurs rarely (with much lower probability) compared
to the average demand dynamics. As the systems evolve through the TF values to
TF=100, the maximum demand dynamics also evolves as an envelope function similar
to the envelope function G(s) in Fig. 18(b). From this discussion we conclude that the
class of CS model systems considered, for λ = 6, also demonstrate SOC signatures.
A similar analysis is also possible for the λ = 7 case.
4.4 Failure progression dynamics in the LOS model
Figure 19 illustrates the profile of “failed cells” versus time for some representative
simulations for the LOS model. For these simulations we set the strength of com-
ponents to the constant Sij = 6 and the load Lij is initialized from a Gaussian dis-
tribution N (3, 0.5). For these simulations, we set the Chebyshev-distance parameter
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r = 1. It can be seen in figure 19, as the simulation progresses, there are breakpoints
in the mean slope of the “failed cells” profile. I.e, there exists a critical time when
the “rate-of-failure” trajectory switches to an increased slope.






















































































Figure 19: Profile of “Failed cells” versus time
To detect when this switch to an increased slope occurs it is necessary to first
smooth the data. Figure 20 illustrates smoothing the “failed cells” time profile using
Matlab’s curve fitting toolbox. The data was smoothed using Local Weighted Linear
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regression techniques.






















#of Failed Cells versus time
#of Failed Cells versus time (Smoothed)
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Figure 20: Smoothing via “Local weighted linear regression”.
After smoothing the data, the data is fit using Linear interpolation and then the
first derivative is approximated. The first derivative approximation is illustrated in
figure 21.











Analysis of fit "dsmoothfit" for dataset "d (smooth)"
Time
(a)















Analysis of fit "fit 5" for dataset "redcount_robust_lowess_linear"
(b)
Figure 21: Fitting using “linear interpolation” and then taking a 1st derivative
4.4.1 Change-point detection
Detecting time points at which the properties of time-series data change are referred
to as change-point detection problems. Change-point detection has been widely re-
searched in areas such as Signal processing, Wavelet analysis, Graphics and Financial
time series research etc. These techniques also go by other names such as: Step
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detection, Jump detection, Edge detection etc. In our case, the intent is to detect
the “critical time” when the mean slope of the “failed cells” profile transitions to an
increased value. We would like to detect the change-point when the system dynamics
switch to a accelerated rate-of-failure.
A change-point detection algorithm based on the Gradient-Threshold method was
implemented. Using first derivative information it is possible to estimate the “critical
time” when the mean slope of the “failed cells” switches. Figure 22 shows the dis-
tributions for 100k Monte-Carlo runs after the implementation of the change-point
detection algorithm. The change-point distribution is plotted (in blue) to the left
of the time-to-failure distribution (plotted in black). The mean-to-mean difference
between the time-to-failure distribution and the change-point time distribution is 5-6
time steps.




















Time−to−failure (point A) distribution
Transition Point (point B) distribution
Figure 22: Distributions for time-to-failure (in black) and change-point (in blue)
4.4.2 Change-point conditional distributions
Also plotted in figure 23 is the “change-point conditional distributions”. These plots
are generated in the following way. First, from the simulation data all failures at
a particular time step (for example: system failures at time step 18) are extracted.
Then change-point distribution for this extracted data set is plotted. Figure 23 shows
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this “conditional change-point distributions” for time-to-failures at time steps: 18, 21,
26 and 28.



















(a) Distribution for Change-Point
detection conditioned on Time-to-
Failure=18
















(b) Distribution for Change-Point
detection conditioned on Time-to-
Failure=21
















(c) Distribution for Change-Point
detection conditioned on Time-to-
Failure=26
















(d) Distribution for Change-Point
detection conditioned on Time-to-
Failure=28
Figure 23: Conditional distributions for change-point detection.
Also it is informative to view the time evolution of the number of failures for
a specific case in a table. Referring again to figures 20(a) and 21(a), we note the
time-to-failure is at time unit 22. The change-point is detected at time unit 15. Thus
the change-point is detected 7 time units before the actual system failure. Table 3
tabulates the number of failed cells at these time points. At time unit 15, the number
of failed cells is 15. At time unit 21 and 22, the number of failed cells is 74 and 103
respectively. The failure criteria is 75 failed cells.
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Table 3: # of failed cells at time 15, 21 and 22
Time unit #of Failed Cells
15 15 Change-point detected
21 74




In this chapter we will discuss the relationship between the extremal models presented
in the previous chapters to real world applications in creep-rupture studies, air-traffic
management and road traffic congestion.
5.1 Creep-rupture studies using the LOS model
The failure of a component after long-term exposure under constant load is called
stress-rupture or creep-rupture. In multi-phase materials, such as fiber-matrix com-
posites, the failure process has several aspects. Under high levels of steady stress,
such materials demonstrate time-dependent mechanical degradation. Randomly dis-
tributed local flaws which grow stochastically in time eventually lead to microcracks
in the fiber-matrix composite. In turn, the local stress loss in these microcracks lead
to load redistribution to neighboring fiber elements. This results in accelerating the
flaw growth in the neighbors and thus causing microcracks in the neighbors. Ulti-
mately several such microcracks join together forming a catastrophic crack. In this
chapter we will see that the statistical nature of the failure process and choice of
fiber-matrix composite parameters lead to not only highly variable composite lifetime
distributions but also to different failure modes.
5.1.1 Creep-rupture model of Mahesh/Phoenix
Mahesh and Phoenix introduced a creep-rupture model for fiber-matrix composites in
[62]. As described in [62] the statistics of fiber failure are governed by the breakdown
model of Coleman [30] which embodies a Weibull hazard functional of fiber load
history imparting power-law sensitivity to fiber load with exponent ρ, and Weibull
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lifetime characteristics with shape parameter β. Fiber load redistribution at breaks
are calculated using a “shear-lag” mechanics model which [62] has found to be more
realistic than idealized load sharing rules such as equal, global or local load sharing.
The study in [62] is concerned with the “avalanche” regime of failure as discussed by
Curtin and Scher in [34] where the composite lifetime follows weakest-link scaling.
The “avalanche” regime of failure will also be our focus for the LOS model. We
shall compare the failure mechanisms of the LOS model and the Mahesh/Phoenix
model in this “avalanche” regime. The study by Mahesh/Phoenix reveals two distinct
failure modes within the avalanche regime. For small ρ, fiber failure is is not very
sensitive to load level and the fiber-matrix composite demonstrates ‘tough’ behavior.
In the ‘tough’ regime, random fiber failures cause progressive distributed damage
until a critical volume fails along with its catastrophic extension. For large ρ, fiber
failure is very sensitive to load level and the fiber-matrix composite fails in a ‘brittle’
manner. In the ‘brittle’ regime, there is a gradual growth of a cluster of mostly
contiguous fiber breaks, these then abruptly transitions into a catastrophic crack. As
we shall see subsequently, depending on the chosen model parameters, the LOS model
demonstrates both ‘tough’ and ‘brittle’ failure modes.
5.1.2 Different rules for load sharing
The model by Mahesh and Phoenix [62] adopts a “shear-lag” mechanics model for
load sharing in fiber-matrix composites. The authors have found that the shear-lag
mechanics model is more realistic than idealized rules for load sharing such as equal,
global or local load-sharing.
Equal load sharing rules were the first to be considered in the literature for the
fiber-bundle lifetime models in [27, 28, 29, 30, 80]. In equal load-sharing when a fiber
fails its load is redistributed equally to the surviving fibers in the bundle.
The concept of equal load-sharing was extended by Ibnabdjalil and Phoenix in
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[48] to incorporate the idea of global load-sharing. Global load-sharing is a more con-
tinuous version of equal load-sharing in which the load of a failed fiber is divided and
transferred equally onto a fairly large number of surviving fibers which are determined
over a certain characteristic distance from the failed fiber.
In addition to equal and global load-sharing rules there are also local load-sharing
rules. Here the load of a failed fiber is transferred laterally to its nearest neighbors
and fibers further away feel little overload. Tierney in [95] and Phoenix and Tierney
in [81] have considered local load-sharing rules in their fiber-matrix composite lifetime
model.
5.1.3 Load sharing based on the Chebyshev-distance parameter
Before presenting the failure mechanism relationships between the LOS model and
the creep-rupture model of Mahesh/Phoenix, we discuss the load redistribution mech-
anism in the LOS model which is controlled by the Chebyshev distance parameter
r.
When a node fails, the corresponding load is transferred to the adjacent nodes.
The load is redistributed to the neighboring nodes according to the Chebyshev dis-
tance r. For the LOS model the Chebyshev-distance parameter r is set to 1 by default.
This means only nodes immediately neighboring the failed node will be considered
for load redistribution. The Chebyshev-distance parameter can be modified to values
other than 1. For example, if r = 2 then only neighboring nodes up to a Euclidean
distance of 2 from the failed node is considered for load redistribution. The effects of
varying the parameter r will be investigated in this section.
Fig. 24 illustrates how Chebyshev distances are considered. In Fig. 24, the red
node at the center has failed at the current time step and the load is redistributed
to the neighboring nodes. The nodes immediately bordering the red node, labeled
‘1’, are at a Chebyshev distance r = 1. Also labeled in the figure are nodes that
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are at Chebyshev distances r = 2 and r = 3 from the red node. Nodes at the same
distance from a failing node are said to be at the same Chebyshev level. Hence,
Fig. 24 illustrates 3 different Chebyshev levels.









































Figure 24: Illustration of Chebyshev distances of the green nodes from the red node.
Next we discuss the exact mechanism of load redistribution. The load can be
redistributed equally among nodes or following different weighting schemes. These
weighting schemes can be thought of as load redistribution policies. Three different
weighting schemes are considered for redistributing the load of the failed node to
the neighboring nodes. The loads from failed nodes are not redistributed to failed
neighboring nodes. Also the different load redistribution schemes do not take into
account the local existing loads at neighboring nodes that are fully operational or
stressed.
In weighting scheme #1, the load is redistributed equally to all fully operational
or stressed nodes regardless of the Chebyshev distance from the failing node. For
r = 1, this scheme would correspond to local-load sharing. On the other hand for
r > 1, this would correspond approximately to equal load-sharing.
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Table 4: Load redistribution weighting scheme #3 for the different Chebyshev levels
Chebyshev distance (r) Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
1 1
2 0.6 0.4
3 0.5 0.3 0.2
4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
5 0.4 0.25 0.15 0.1 0.1
In weighting scheme #2, the load is first distributed equally to the different Cheby-
shev levels, then the distributed load is divided equally among the “not failed” nodes
existing at that particular Chebyshev level. For r > 1 this scheme would correspond
approximately to variants of global load-sharing.
In weighting scheme #3, each Chebyshev level is assigned a specific weight wi and
the load is assigned to each level according to those weights. Note,
∑n
i=1wi = 1,
where n is the number of Chebyshev levels. The “not failed” nodes at a particular
level then divide the load equally among themselves. Typically Chebyshev levels at a
greater distance are assigned a lower weight or proportion of the load while Chebyshev
levels closer to the failed nodes are assigned a higher proportion of the load. For r > 1
this scheme would correspond approximately to variants of global load-sharing.
Fig. 25 illustrates these three different weighting scheme on a per node basis for
the case when the number of Chebyshev levels r = 4. Table 4 tabulates one possible
option for weighting scheme #3 for different Chebyshev levels r = 1..5.
Depending on the system size n and how the system is decomposed (e.g the size of
the fiber bundles in the fiber-matrix composite model), using the Chebyshev distance
r and the different weighting schemes, it is possible to model the different load sharing
rules. For example with r = 1 and weighting scheme #1 it is possible to model local
load-sharing. On the hand with r = 4 and weighting scheme #3 it is possible to
model a variant of global load-sharing. With r = 4 and weighting scheme #1 one
could tentatively model equal load-sharing.
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(a) Weighting scheme #1


















(b) Weighting scheme #2





















(c) Weighting scheme #3
Figure 25: Different Load redistribution weighting schemes on a per node basis for
Chebyshev distance r = 4.
5.1.4 Comparison between the LOS model and the Mahesh/Phoenix model
To compare the failure mechanisms of the LOS model with the failure mechanisms
demonstrated by the Mahesh/Phoenix creep-rupture model, we will initialize the
LOS model parameters such that we obtain similar failure patterns as obtained by
the Mahesh/Phoenix model.
For LOS model we have the following parameters that we need to tune appropri-
ately. The parameter η ∈ (0, 1) is the strength degradation parameter. η controls the
threshold when loss of component strength initiates. For low values of η, for example
η = 0.3, components will be overcome by lower amounts of load but components will
spend greater lengths of time in LOS dynamics. For high values of η, for example
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η = 0.8, higher amounts of load will be needed to overcome components but compo-
nents will spend comparatively less time in LOS dynamics. In general, the parameter
η controls the level of load required to initiate LOS dynamics and also the time a
component engages in LOS dynamics. At this point we could postulate that higher
values of η might lead to ‘brittle’ failure since failure will take place abruptly with
little precursory activity in the form of LOS dynamics. On the other hand, low values
of η might lead to ‘’tough’ behavior as component failure will occur after multiple
components have undergone considerable LOS dynamics.
The second parameter we will tune is the Chebyshev-distance parameter r. For the
simulations to be presented we have used weighting scheme #3 as shown in Table 4. In
the simulations we consider Chebyshev distances r = 1, 3, 5. For r = 1, we essentially
model local-load sharing. For r = 3, 5 we are essentially modeling global load-sharing
which is a more refined and continuous version of equal load-sharing as discussed
previously.
Since we would like to model fiber-matrix composite creep-rupture with the LOS
model we need to set the component strength appropriately. In strength, fibers,
strands and pressure vessels tend to follow a Weibull distribution [81]. Experimental
values for the Weibull shape parameter range from 5 to 9 for fibers and from 25
to 35 for strands and pressure vessels. In failure time, strands and pressure vessels
also appear to follow a Weibull distribution [96]. Based on this information, in the
simulations, we initialize the LOS model component strength by sampling from a
Weibull distribution with scale parameter 9 and shape parameter 25. Consequently,
we are attempting to mimic the strength behavior of pressure vessels with the LOS
model. In conjunction with the parameters η and r, we will next discuss the similarity
of the failure mechanisms of the LOS model and the Mahesh/Phoenix model.
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5.1.5 Simulation setup
For each setting of the parameters η and r we run 30,000 monte-carlo simulations. We
set the system size to n = 10. The system strength and r is initialized as described
in the previous section. For the parameter η, we investigate the values 0.5, 0.7 and
0.9. With η = 0.5, components will spend greater amounts of time in LOS dynamics
compared η = 0.9. However, the load required to initiate LOS dynamics will greater
for η = 0.9 compared to η = 0.5.
Following Mahesh and Phoenix, we are particularly interested in analyzing the
‘avalanche’ regime of failure which is characterized by components failing in a chain
or cascade one after the other. In the ‘avalanche’ regime, we capture the failure time
for the complete system or 100 components and also the failure time for the first 20
components to fail. The ‘avalanche’ regime is reached by identifying the loads that
causes the entire system to collapse for a given setting of system strength, η and r. In
particular, we are interested in establishing whether we can capture tough and brittle
failure modes in the ‘avalanche’ regime and also whether the failure time distributions
agree with those in the literature.
5.1.6 η = 0.5, 0.7 with Chebyshev distance r = 1
5.1.6.1 Tough failure regime
First, we set η = 0.5 and run 30,000 simulations for each value of r = 1, 3, 5. For each
value of r, we identify the minimum load required for complete system failure. By
increasing the load above this minimum load, we identify the different failure modes.
We then repeat this process for η = 0.7.
The Chebyshev distance setting r = 1 corresponds to local load-sharing. For r = 1
and η = 0.5, we observe complete system failure for the minimum load L = 3.75. The
corresponding failure time distributions are shown in Fig. 26. Similarly for r = 1
and η = 0.7, we observe complete system failure for minimum load L = 4.5. The
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corresponding failure time distributions are shown in Fig. 27. In both cases, the failure
time distributions follow a Log-normal distribution. This result is in agreement with
Mahesh and Phoenix where they demonstrate for small ρ, the composite failure time
follows a Log-normal distribution. They have identified this failure mode as ‘tough’
behavior. In this regime, fiber failure is is not very sensitive to load level. In the
‘tough’ regime, random fiber failures cause progressive distributed damage until a
critical volume fails along with its catastrophic extension.
In the ‘avalanche’ regime, the small ρ parameter of Mahesh/Phoenix corresponds
to our low values of load L = 3.75 for η = 0.5 and L = 4.5 for η = 0.7. These loads
are high enough to initiate LOS dynamics in some components in the system. When
these components fail, their load is redistributed to neighboring components which
then initiate LOS dynamics. This cycle of LOS dynamics and load redistribution
keeps on repeating in cascade from one component to the next until the entire system
fails. Thus for our system, the value of load L = 3.75 for η = 0.5 and L = 4.5 for
η = 0.7 corresponds to the ‘tough’ failure regime.
5.1.6.2 Brittle failure regime
As the loads are iteratively increased we observe the failure mechanism transition
from the tough failure mode to a brittle failure mode. At loads greater than L = 5.5
for η = 0.5 we observe that the failure time distribution follows a Weibull distribution.
This is shown in Fig. 28. Also at loads greater than L = 6 for η = 0.7 we observe that
the failure time distribution follows a Weibull distribution. This is shown in Fig. 29.
At these load setting the load is high enough that components fail with minimum
LOS dynamics. Once a component fails its load redistribution is sufficient enough
to cause neighboring components to fail and redistribute their load thus triggering a
cascade of failures. The entire system abruptly collapses in a ‘brittle’ manner. Load
settings greater than L = 5.5 for η = 0.5 and L = 6 for η = 0.7 correspond to the
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Load =  3.75, r = 1 and η =  0.5
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Probability plot for Lognormal distribution





























Probability plot for Lognormal distribution
 
 
Number of samples =25000
(c) L = 3.75
Figure 26: Log-Normal fit. r=1, η = 0.5
















Load =  4.50, r = 1 and η =  0.7
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Probability plot for Lognormal distribution
 
 
Number of samples =20892
(b) L = 4.5
Figure 27: Log-Normal fit. r=1, η = 0.7
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large ρ settings of Mahesh and Phoenix. They have also found that for large ρ, fiber-
matrix composite failure time follows a Weibull distribution. For large ρ, the fiber is
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Probability plot for Weibull distribution
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(c) L = 5.5


















Load =  6.00, r = 1 and η =  0.5
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Probability plot for Weibull distribution
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Probability plot for Weibull distribution
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(f) L = 6
Figure 28: Weibull fit. r=1, η = 0.5
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Probability plot for Weibull distribution
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Probability plot for Weibull distribution
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(c) L = 6
Figure 29: Weibull fit. r=1, η = 0.7
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5.1.7 η = 0.5, 0.7 with Chebyshev distance r = 3 and r = 5
5.1.7.1 Tough failure regime
Chebyshev distance r = 3 and r = 5 with weighting scheme #3 corresponds to a
form of global load-sharing as described in Ibnabdjalil and Phoenix [48]. Global
load-sharing is a more continuous from of equal load-sharing. For load settings in
the ’avalanche’ regime we can identify two different failure modes for the parameter
settings η = 0.5, 0.7 for r = 3, 5.
For both η = 0.5, 0.7, at low load settings the failure time distribution follows
a normal distribution for both r = 3, 5. For η = 0.5, this is shown in Fig. 30 for
r = 3 and Fig. 31 for r = 5. Similarly for η = 0.7, the normal distribution failure
times are shown in Fig. 32 for r = 3 and Fig. 33 for r = 5. This is in agreement
with [80], where the author established that the lifetime of a equal load-sharing fiber
bundle is asymptotically normally distributed. This result makes intuitive sense since
as the Chebyshev-distance for load redistribution is increased to r = 3 or r = 5, the
components in the system are provided greater opportunities to survive through load
sharing. Thus, even though the system does ultimately collapse at these low load
settings, the failure mode is more dispersed and spread over greater lengths of time.
And the failure time distribution is under lied by the normal distribution.
The minimum load settings exciting the avalanche failures observed for the dis-
tributions in Figs. 30, 31, 32, 33 correspond to the tough or dispersed failure
regime.
5.1.7.2 Brittle failure regime
Next, by iteratively increasing the load we arrive at load settings that cause the
system to transition from the tough failure regime to the brittle failure regime for
η = 0.5, 0.7 at r = 3, 5.
For both η = 0.5, 0.7, at high load settings the failure time distribution follows a
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Load =  4.50, r = 3 and η =  0.5
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Probability plot for Normal distribution
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Load =  5.00, r = 3 and η =  0.5
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Probability plot for Normal distribution
 
 
Number of samples =25000
(d) L = 5
Figure 30: Normal fit. r=3, η = 0.5
91

















Load =  4.50, r = 5 and η =  0.5
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Probability plot for Normal distribution
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Load =  5.00, r = 5 and η =  0.5
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Probability plot for Normal distribution
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Load =  6.00, r = 5 and η =  0.5
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Probability plot for Normal distribution
 
 
Number of samples =25000
(f) L = 6
Figure 31: Normal fit. r=5, η = 0.5
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Load =  5.00, r = 3 and η =  0.7
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Probability plot for Normal distribution
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Probability plot for Lognormal distribution
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(c) L = 5
Figure 32: Normal fit. r=3, η = 0.7
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Load =  5.00, r = 5 and η =  0.7
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Probability plot for Normal distribution
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Probability plot for Normal distribution
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(c) L = 5
Figure 33: Normal fit. r=5, η = 0.7
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Load =  6.50, r = 3 and η =  0.5
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Probability plot for Weibull distribution



























Probability plot for Weibull distribution
 
 
Number of samples =25000
(c) L = 6.5
Figure 34: Weibull fit. r=3, η = 0.5
Weibull distribution for both r = 3, 5. For η = 0.5, this is shown in Fig. 34 for r = 3
and Fig. 35 for r = 5. Similarly for η = 0.7, the Weibull distribution failure times are
shown in Fig. 36 for r = 3 and Fig. 37 for r = 5. This results makes intuitive sense
because as the load is increased the, the advantage gained by redistributing the load
over increased Chebyshev distances is diminished. So even though r = 3 or r = 5,
for high load settings the system fails in a brittle manner. Correspondingly the high
load settings for the distributions in Figs. 34, 35, 36, 37 correspond to the brittle
failure regime.
5.1.8 η = 0.9 with Chebyshev distance r = 1, r = 3 and r = 5
The failure behavior of the system at η = 0.9 is very interesting since for this pa-
rameter value the system engages in minimal LOS dynamics. At this setting, large
values of load are required to initiate LOS dynamics and then components spend
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Load =  7.00, r = 5 and η =  0.5
 
 
Number of samples =25000






















Probability plot for Weibull distribution



























Probability plot for Weibull distribution
 
 
Number of samples =25000
(c) L = 7
Figure 35: Weibull fit. r=5, η = 0.5
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Load =  6.50, r = 3 and η =  0.7
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Probability plot for Weibull distribution





























Probability plot for Weibull distribution
 
 
Number of samples =25000
(c) L = 6.5
Figure 36: Weibull fit. r=3, η = 0.7
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Load =  6.50, r = 5 and η =  0.7
 
 
Number of samples =25000













0.1   
0.25  
0.5   
0.75  0.9   
0.99  0.999 







Probability plot for Weibull distribution































Probability plot for Weibull distribution
 
 
Number of samples =25000
(c) L = 6.5
Figure 37: Weibull fit. r=5, η = 0.7
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Load =  6.50, r = 1 and η =  0.9
(a) L = 6.5



























y = − 3.9*x + 3.6
Prob(tail) ≤ 0.99
(b) L = 6.5















Load =  7.00, r = 1 and η =  0.9
(c) L = 7


























y = − 4.6*x + 2.5
Number of samples =25000
   linear
(d) L = 7
Figure 38: Power Law fit. r=1, η = 0.9
minimum time in the loss of strength process. Consequently the load redistribution
is sufficient to trigger failure in neighboring components which in turn trigger chains
of load redistribution and failure. Through out this process component time spent
in LOS is minimum. Also at η = 0.9, the effects of the chebyshev parameter r is
diminished. For all values of r, we observe the system collapsing through a power-law
distribution.
5.1.8.1 Chebyshev distance r = 1
For r = 1, the power-law distribution for system failure time is shown in Fig. 38.
The power-law distribution is observed for load values greater than L = 6.5. Below
L = 6.5, the system is resilient and cascading failure is not triggered. This is due to
the high threshold value of η = 0.9.
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Load =  6.00, r = 3 and η =  0.9
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Probability plot for Weibull distribution
 
 
Number of samples =1753
(b) L = 6













Load =  6.50, r = 3 and η =  0.9





























Probability plot for Weibull distribution
 
 
Number of samples =17201
(d) L = 6.5
Figure 39: Weibull fit. r=3, η = 0.9
5.1.8.2 Chebyshev distance r = 3
For r = 3, we do observe a transition in failure time distribution. From a Weibull
distribution for L = 6 to a power-law distribution for L = 7. The Weibull distri-
bution for failure time is shown in Fig. 39 and the power-law distribution is shown
in Fig. 40. However, even though we have different distributions for the failure time
at these loads, the system is still collapsing in the brittle failure regime. This is
due to the high threshold value of η = 0.9 which is resulting in little LOS dynamics
taking place. However failure is taking place mainly due to cascading chains of load
redistributions from one component to the next which is causing the entire system to
collapse abruptly in a brittle manner.
Again due to the high threshold value η = 0.9, the system is resilient and cascading
failure is not triggered for load values lower than L = 6 for r = 3.
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Load =  7.00, r = 3 and η =  0.9
(a) L = 7



























y = − 4.3*x + 4.8
Prob(tail) ≤ 0.9
(b) L = 7
















Load =  7.50, r = 3 and η =  0.9





























y = − 4.9*x + 3.1
Prob(tail) ≤ 0.95
(d) L = 7.5
Figure 40: Power Law fit. r=3, η = 0.9
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5.1.8.3 Chebyshev distance r = 5
Also for r = 5, we observe a transition in failure time distribution. From a Log-normal
distribution for L = 7 to a power-law distribution for L = 7.5. The Log-normal
distribution for failure time is shown in Fig. 41 and the power-law distribution is
shown in Fig. 42. However, even though we have different distributions for the failure
time at these loads, the system is still collapsing in the brittle failure regime. This is
due to the high threshold value of η = 0.9 which is resulting in little LOS dynamics
taking place. However failure is taking place mainly due to cascading chains of load
redistributions from one component to the next which is causing the entire system to
collapse abruptly in a brittle manner.
Again due to the high threshold value η = 0.9, the system is resilient and cascading
failure is not triggered for load values lower than L = 7 for r = 5. We also note the
load required for the ‘avalanche’ failure for r = 5 is slightly higher than the loads for
r = 1, 3. This indicates there is some sensitivity to the load redistribution chebyshev-
distance. The system is slightly more resilient when r = 5 compared to when r = 1, 3.
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Load =  7.00, r = 5 and η =  0.9



























Probability plot for Lognormal distribution
 
 
Number of samples =24921
(b) L = 7
Figure 41: Log-Normal fit. r=5, η = 0.9















Load =  7.50, r = 5 and η =  0.9
(a) L = 7.5


























y = − 4.1*x + 2.6
Number of samples =25000
   linear
(b) L = 7.5
Figure 42: Power Law fit. r=5, η = 0.9
5.2 Air traffic management using the CS model
In this section we discuss the relationship between the CS model and Aggregate flow
models described in air traffic management literature [86, 92, 93]. We will detail how
the aggregate flow models can be reformulated in a form that completely matches the
CS model description.
5.2.1 Aggregate flow models for air traffic management
We refer the reader to [86, 93] for a detailed description on Aggregate flow models
for air traffic management. Here we only provide the details necessary to demon-
strate the method of reformulating the Aggregate flow model to match the CS model
specification.
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(a) Continental United State airspace
(b) Center network model
Figure 43: Continental United States airspace center model. Reproduced from [93].
The airspace in the continental United States is divided into 20 centers. This is
shown in Fig. 43(a). The flow relationship between neighboring centers is shown via
links in Fig. 43(b). Fig. 43 is reproduced from [93]. It is clear from Fig. 43 that the
centers lend themselves to a graph theoretic network structure.
The flow through a center i is composed of a inflow component and a outflow com-





















Arrivals to airports in 
center i
Figure 44: Aircraft flow contributions in center i. Reproduced from [93].
airports in the center i) and the number of aircraft entering center i from neighboring
centers j. The outflow is composed of the number of aircraft arrivals (landings at
airports in center i) and the number of aircraft leaving the center i to neighboring
centers j in a time interval ∆t. This flow mechanism is depicted in Fig. 44.
Utilizing the principle of conservation of flow in a center, the number of aircraft
in center i at the next time instant k + 1 can be related to the number of aircraft in
the center at the current time k through the difference equation Eq. 32,






βjixj(k) + di(k) (32)
The number of aircraft in center i is denoted by xi(k). Departures from airports
within center i are denoted by di(k). The fractions βij and βji are transition proba-
bilities obtained as described in [86]. βij represents the transition probability of an
aircraft from center i traveling to center j. βji represents the transition probability
of an aircraft from center j entering center i.
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Figure 45: Inflow and outflow of aircraft flow in center i.
into each center becomes clear and we can visualize flow in the centers through Fig. 45.
The flow in Fig. 45 is similar to component inflow/outflow in the CS model. Using
Eq. 32, the aggregate flow model can be reformulated in terms of inflow and outflow








βijxi(k) + βiixi(k) (33b)
In Eq. 33 the inflow and outflow is composed of the number of aircraft entering
and exiting a center. Eq. 32 and Eq. 33 together completely specify the aggregate
flow model in a CS model component framework. The number of components would
be equal to the number of centers that are considered for analysis. In Fig. 46 we show
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Figure 46: Continental United States airspace centers on a graph network represen-
tation. Reproduced from [86].
the centers in the continental United States using a graph network representation
which is reproduced from [86]. In the previous chapters we have implemented the
CS model on a scale-free network topology. Clearly using Eqs. 32, 33 and Fig. 46 we
can model the aggregate flow model for the continental United States in a CS model
framework on a graph topology. Note, so far the only thing we have done is to take
the aggregate air traffic model and reformulate it in a framework that fits the CS
model description. All simulations, analysis and results of the aggregate flow model
demonstrated in [86, 91, 92, 93, 22] would also hold in the CS model framework.
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5.2.2 Air traffic congestion management using the CS model representa-
tion
In this section we investigate the possibility of using the CS model framework for air
traffic management developed in the previous section for congestion management in
the national airspace system (NAS).
Demand-Capacity imbalances in the national airspace system (NAS) have been
reported to cause 215,000 hours of reportable delay [45] between January 2003 and
October 2004. Also from the same reference the cost of these delays to airlines have
been calculated to be around $700 million. The impact of airport capacity constraints
on the NAS delays have been studied in [23]. The authors investigate the impact of
arrival or departure capacity reduction at each of the major airports in the NAS on the
arrival and departure delays at other major airports in the continental United States.
The FAA’s Air Traffic Control System Command Center (ATCSCC) regularly utilizes
playbook reroutes, ground delay programs (GDPS), ground stops (GSs), miles-in-trail
restrictions to mitigate congestion resulting from these demand-capacity imbalances
[45].
For congestion management using the CS model air traffic framework we invision
using the load sharing property of the CS model to deal with demand-capacity im-
balances in the national air space system. A hypothetical congestion management
system would work in the following way. The load would be shared within centers by
shifting the number of aircraft between them. To understand how this would work we
refer the reader again to Fig. 45. Suppose a center i is weather impacted. In that case
both the arrival and departure capacity of center i would be reduced. This means the
terms A and D in Fig. 45 would undergo a net decrease as would term C but term B
would remain the same. This would result in a demand-capacity imbalance at center
i. Also the load sharing capacity of center i to accept arriving aircraft would decrease.
The demand due to term B would be load shared with the neighboring centers in
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the system assuming those centers themselves have not undergone a aircraft arrival
capacity reduction. It is our opinion using this scheme it would be possible to study
in a structured and aggregate way the impact of demand-capacity imbalances in the
national airspace system arising due to weather or other factors.
To test whether this scheme would provide insight and knowledge on congestion
management in the national airspace system, as part of future investigations we pro-
pose to use the NAS data from [93, 23] in the framework discussed above. It is
our opinion, using real aircraft arrival-departure data from [93, 23] would allow us
to fully measure the capabilities of the CS model air traffic congestion management
framework.
5.3 Road traffic congestion studies using the CS model
In this section we provide an example of how the CS model could be used to develop
policy to manage and mitigate road traffic congestion. This example is motivated by
the so called “Atlanta Snow Jam 2014” traffic congestion event1.
The “Atlanta Snow Jam 2014” traffic congestion event occurred on Tuesday, Jan-
uary 28th, 2014. A snow storm was forecast for regions south of the metro Atlanta
area. However, the storm arrived early and changed direction slightly. Eventually the
metro Atlanta area experienced two and half inches of snow starting around noon.
State, city and businesses decided to let employees leave around 1 pm. Schools also
decided to send students home around 1 pm. What resulted next was traffic con-
gestion and gridlock chaos of epic proportions. Commutes that usually took 30-45
minutes ended up taking 10-15 hours in bumper to bumper traffic. Many school
children spent the night in the cold in their school buses without adequate heating,
warm clothes and food. In addition, school children who didn’t make it onto school
buses spent the night bedding down in their schools.
1Alexis Stevens, “Metro commuters recount their hours-long trip home”, The Atlanta Journal-
Constitution, January 29, 2014
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In hind sight, it became clear that allowing such a large number of vehicles on
Atlanta roads at the same time was a monumentally incorrect decision. This resulted
in tremendous psychological trauma for those involved and also endangered the lives of
school children, the sick and the elderly who were stuck in traffic. However, no policy
was in place at the state, city and local levels for the different responsible agencies to
communicate and decide on not permitting such a large number of vehicles to enter
Atlanta roads at the same time.
In this section, we use the CS model to provide a traffic congestion interpretation
that allows policy makers to observe how the number of vehicles, above a particular
threshold introduced at the same time in metropolitan roads, might result in massive
congestion. By using the CS model with parameters set to values corresponding to
real-world traffic rates and capacities, policy makers possess a tool by which to decide
on the level of traffic to introduce to metropolitan area roads at the same time.
The interpretation works in the following way. Consider the maximal dynamics
of the CS model from Chapter II which we reproduce again in Fig. 47(a) and 47(b).
The figures correspond to the mean traffic arrival rate λ = 6. We interpret the
components of the CS model as corresponding to “segments of metropolitan roads”.
In this interpretation we do not track the source and destination of traffic. Interpret
“Max Demand” as “Maximum number of vehicles observed in a time sample over a
observation window”.
In Fig. 47, interpret TF=100 to correspond to massive congestion which is a low
probability event. An example would be the congestion that was observed during the
“Atlanta Snow Jam” event. Interpret a regular metropolitan traffic commute day as
TF=15 which represents normally observed congestion. Note we could also interpret
TF=10 or TF=20 as a regular commute day. From Fig. 47(b), we can clearly see that
the “Max Demand” responsible for TF=100 is much larger than the “Max Demand”
for TF=15. Implying that maximal traffic dynamics is responsible for the level of
110


























(a) Multiple failures modes





















(b) Maximum Demand as a function of TF
Figure 47: Extremal behavior of the CS model for λ = 6 (Color Online)
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congestion. For both cases the average traffic λ = 6 is the same.
Based on the above analysis, policy makers could adapt the CS model parameters
to real-world traffic rates and capacities of different metropolitan areas. CS model
components would represent road segments of interest. They could then forecast the
threshold value of vehicles which would cause different levels of congestion in the
metropolitan area of interest. Based on the forecasts, policy could be formulated to
manage and mitigate traffic congestion in the metropolitan area of interest.
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CHAPTER VI
MOTION PLANNING FOR DISTRIBUTED
MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS USING THE DUBINS
VEHICLE MODEL
In this chapter, we implement the Markov-Dubins vehicle model to study air traffic
congestion phenomena for distributed multi-agent systems. We extend the Markov-
Dubins vehicle model to 3-dimensional space and time. The model is implemented
using the NETLogo programming language. We refer to the implementation as NET-
Dubins. We demonstrate NETDubins for multi-agent simulations utilizing user de-
fined trajectories, optimal trajectories and helical maneuvers. We provide an example
of using NETDubins for simulating notional air traffic vectoring at Los Angeles In-
ternational Airport.
6.1 Introduction
NETDubins is a trajectory generation toolbox written in the NETLogo programming
dialect. NETDubins is designed for multi-agent system simulations in a 3D environ-
ment. The toolbox was implemented as part of NASA’s NextGen research effort.
The algorithm employed by the toolbox is based on the Markov-Dubins vehicle
model, which is a 2D vehicle. The implemented algorithm extends the Markov-Dubins
model to incorporate vehicles in a 3D world. This extension allows for the generation
of 3-dimensional trajectories for multi-agent simulations.
Although the toolbox is implemented for use in NETLogo, a MATLAB version
of the code exists. The MATLAB version is mainly used as a test bed for rapid
prototyping and debugging of new procedures and concepts.
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6.2 History
The Markov-Dubins model deals with the problem of curvature-constrained, shortest
paths in the plane with prescribed initial and terminal positions and orientations.
As described in [8], this problem can be traced back to the end of the nineteenth
century when the Russian mathematician A. A. Markov first posed the problem for
joining pieces of railway tracks. Characterizing the minimal path completely was
only done recently by Dubins [38] and by Reeds and Shepp [85]. Another way of
solving this problem, using optimal control theory, has recently been proposed in
[19]. In this effort synthesizing the shortest or optimal path is achieved through
purely geometric techniques. This is because, sophisticated mathematical libraries
that are available in MATLAB are not readily available in NETLogo. Examples
include Linear Algebra, Optimization, Differential equation libraries, which although
not readily available in NETLogo can be developed with necessary investment. The
object for this development is for a toolbox to generate trajectories for multi-agent
systems using NETLogo’s existing software infrastructure.
6.3 2-Dimensional Theory
Given two oriented points in the plane, (xi, yi, θi) and (xf , yf , θf ) , it is required to
determine the shortest path of bounded curvature (ρ) joining them. The Markov-
Dubins kinematic model is given by the following equations where (κ) is the control
input:
ẋ = cosθ
ẏ = sinθ (34)
θ̇ = κ/ρ
Each oriented point can travel in either a clockwise (denoted CWi and CWf ) or


















Figure 48: Two oriented points in the plane. Also shown are the two possible circles
(radius 1
ρ
) of travel for each orientation and the four tangents connecting one possible
circle combination
and the two arrival circles there are four possible departure/arrival circle combina-
tions.
There exists four tangents between two circles that don’t intersect at any point
and also do not lie within each other. Two of these tangents intersect and are referred
to as “cross tangents” (denoted CTT and CTB). The other two tangents are referred
to as “outer tangents” (denoted OTT and OTB).
For a given initial orientation θi, due to the directional constraint on motion, the
vehicle can proceed along two of the four tangents. For example, in Figure 48 the
vehicle can only proceed along tangents CTB and OTB. Of these two tangents the
vehicle can arrive at orientation θf only along tangent OTB otherwise the directional
constraint on motion would be violated. This implies for a given departure/arrival
circle combination there exists only one optimal path from a orientation θi to a
orientation θf . Since there are four possible circle combinations, there exists four
optimal paths. The shortest path is selected from these four optimal paths.
Below in Figure 49, the four optimal paths are shown for the oriented points of


























(d) Optimal path from circle CWi to circle CWf
Figure 49: The four optimal paths between two oriented points xi, yi, θi and xf , yf , θf
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6.4 Extension to 3-Dimensions
Given two points with coordinates and orientation, (xi, yi, zi, ψi) and (xf , yf , zi, ψf ),
it is required to find the shortest path. In this case it is assumed the orientations, ψi
and ψf , correspond to the ”heading” of the vehicle in a 3D environment or the angle
between the positive y-axis and the projection of the velocity vector on the 2D plane
in a right handed system. The radius, 1/ρ, relates to the ”roll” of the vehicle. With
these assumptions, the shortest 3D path of the vehicle, d3d, is determined through
the Pythagorean theorem and the ”Flight path angle”, γ, is determined through
trigonometry.
First, the 3D geometry is projected on to the 2D plane, from (xi, yi, zi, ψi) and
(xf , yf , zi, ψf ) to (xi, yi, ψi) and (xf , yf , ψf ). Then, as described in section 6.3, the
shortest 2d path, d2d, is determined. The length of the shortest path, d2d, and the
altitude drop, zi−zf , is used to calculate the length of the shortest 3D path, d3d, and
the flight path angle, γ as:
d3d =
√





With the prescribed heading information, ψ (from the 2D analysis) and the com-
puted flight path angle, γ, it is possible to move around optimally in the 3D world.
The examples in the next sections illustrates this.
Subsequently, the kinematics for the ”Extended Markov-Dubins” model is given
by the equations:
ẋ = cosψ




6.4.1 Dealing with limits on Pitch or Flight Path Angle
In many cases it is desirable that the Pitch or Flight path angle of a vehicle not
exceed a certain threshold, denoted γlimit. The toolbox deals with this scenario in the
following way. First, a shortest path is computed. If the trajectory γ violates γlimit,
then the radius’s are increased until γ satisfies γlimit. The radius’s also have an upper
limit imposed on them, denoted rlimit. If γlimit is not satisfied even though rlimit has
been reached, in that case a helical maneuver is executed. The helical maneuver is
discussed in section 6.8
6.5 Computational algorithm
6.5.1 Directional Vector and Circle center determination
The position and orientation of the initial and final point is given. Using this infor-
mation the directional vector of the orientation is determined. The directional vector
is tangent to both the clockwise and counter-clockwise circle. Moving ±90o in either
direction of the directional vector for a length of 1/ρ (the circle radius) provides the
circle centers for both the clockwise and counter-clockwise motion.
6.5.2 Tangent calculation algorithm
Previously, we have described the procedure for determining the circle centers and
the radius of the circles. For a given departure/arrival circle configuration we can
calculate the possible four tangents. Travel is possible for only one of these tangents
for a given departure/arrival circle combination. Using rules from trigonometry we
can calculate the position and orientation of the two “cross tangents” and the two
“outer tangents”.
6.5.3 Travel tangent deduction algorithm
A given departure/arrival circle combination results in four possible tangents. Of
these four tangents, motion is possible only across one of these tangents. Using
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initial and final heading information, the orientation information of the four tangents
and vector cross product rules it is possible to deduce the tangent that will be utilized
for vehicle motion. The travel tangent deduction algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 50.
6.5.4 Motion planning algorithm
Once the trajectory has been determined, motion can be scheduled along the path.
The path is composed of three separate components. These are the departure arc,
the travel tangent and arrival arc. The motion planning algorithm is illustrated in
Fig. 51.
6.6 Example: Shortest path maneuver
Figure 52(a) and Figure 52(b) demonstrates the shortest 3d path using the algorithm
described in section 6.4.
6.7 Example: User selected optimal trajectory
A user can select which one of the four departure/arrival circle combinations the
vehicle should traverse. These four combinations are demonstrated in Figure 52(c)
and Figure 52(d) for the same initial and final position and orientation.
6.8 Example: Helical maneuver
The user also has the option of executing a helical maneuver if desired. Currently the
helical maneuver is invoked based on the γlimit parameter. The procedure works as
follows, if the γlimit constraint is not satisfied by γ even after increasing the radius’s of
the departure/arrival circle combination than the vehicle initiates a helical maneuver
from (xi, yi, zi, ψi) to (xi, yi, zt, ψi). In the helical maneuver γlimit is not violated. Then
the vehicle follows a optimal/shortest path from (xi, yi, zt, ψi) to (xf , yf , zf , ψf ). zt is
at an altitude such that γlimit is not violated. Figure 53 illustrates a spiral maneuver.
The helical maneuver can be modified as necessary.
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6.9 Example: LAX CDA (Continuous Descent Approach)
vectoring maneuver
Continuous Descent Approach (CDA) is a method by which aircraft approach airports
prior to landing. It is designed to minimize fuel consumption and noise compared
to the conventional landing. A description of CDA is provided in [26]. The hazard
scenarios of CDA at Los Angles airport (LAX) has been modeled in [42, 43]. A
diagram of the LAX CDA is shown in Figure 54.
In [42, 43] a simulation model implemented in NETLOGO ([105]) for the LAX
CDA approach is described. This simulation model is used as a test bed in the
subsequent discussion. Due to conflict arising between incoming aircraft on the LAX
CDA a vectoring maneuver is executed for conflict resolution as a last resort. This
vectoring maneuver has been modeled using the NETDubins toolbox.
Each vectoring trajectory is modeled by concatenating two optimal paths. First,
a required trajectory length (based on airspeed) that will de-conflict the aircraft is
established. This trajectory is broken into two individual components and the point
where the two trajectories are concatenated (the ”join-point”) is established. The first
trajectory moves the aircraft from the CDA vectoring start point to the join-point.
The second trajectory moves the aircraft from the join-point to the CDA trajectory
merge point. The calculation of the join-point is discussed next.
6.9.1 Trajectory join-point calculation
Figure 55 illustrates the trajectory join-point calculation. The trajectory ”join-point”,
denoted by J, is calculated using trigonometric techniques. Let the vectoring start
and end points be A and B respectively. First, A and B are projected on to the 2d
plane and the 2d distance between A and B, dAB, is calculated. In the same manner
the required 2d trajectory length, TL, is calculated.
From Figure 55, we must have TL = s1 + s2. First, the parameter θ is selected.
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Next the first segment length, s1, is calculated using the following formula derived
from trigonometric relations:
s1 =
T 2L − d2AB
2(TL − dAB cos θ)
Once s1 is known, the coordinates of J can be calculated as,
Jx = Ax + s1 cos θ
Jy = Ay + s1 sin θ
The z coordinate of J is determined using the ratio s1/TL which is used to determine
the corresponding drop in altitude.
In Figure 55, θ explicitly controls h due to the constraint TL = s1 + s2. The
parameter effect of θ on h is demonstrated in Figure 56. Making θ smaller makes h
larger. In Figure 56 all the trajectories length are approximated by fitting triangles
and are of equal length. In the simulations θ is picked so that h is minimized but the
aircraft does not fly ”backwards”.
Figure 57 illustrate two trajectories, A and B, that are of equal lengths in a
triangle approximation. The synthesized lengths of A and B are within 3% of each
other. Trajectory A was generated by setting θ = 60o and trajectory B was generated
by setting θ = 90o. Trajectory A has higher h than trajectory B.
6.9.2 Optimization algorithm to enforce kinematic constraints
The kinematics of the extended Markov-Dubins vehicle is given by equation 35. The
aircraft kinematic constraints are enforced using the standard aircraft performance
metrics: Load factor, n, Bank angle, φ, Flight path angle, γ and Turn radius, R.
Refer to [100] for an excellent discussion on turning flight in descending altitude. For




For γ ∈ (0, 3), we have cosγ = 0.99 ≈ 1, hence γ dependence is weak. The equations





From equation 36, minimization of φ can be done by minimizing n. From Newton’s

















Thus maximizing R and minimizing V will minimize n and a basis for an optimization
algorithm is established.
The implemented optimization algorithm works in the following way. First, a
upper bound on the turning radius R is established based on the true airspeed V of
the vehicle and the Bank Angle φ constraint. Then the turn radius is incrementally
decreased in a loop while checking that the Bank angle φ and Flight path angle γ
constraints are met. This algorithm was chosen due to the geometry of the LAX CDA
approach. As mentioned in section 6.3, the optimal path algorithm only works in the
case of non-intersecting departure/arrival circle combinations. A algorithm based on
radius decrease implies less computation to synthesize a optimal trajectory.
Using this approach, Figures 58(a) and 58(b) shows synthesized trajectories with
V = 265 knots, R = 2.4 nautical miles, φ = 23o, γ = −2.3oand n = 1.08. Figures 58(c)
and 58(d) shows synthesized trajectories for V = 400 knots, R = 5.2 nautical miles,























































(d) Departure motion is counter-clockwise and arrival motion is
clockwise.




































































(b) Path discretized into three seperate components.
Figure 51: Illustration to describe motion planning algorithm.
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(a) Top view: Shortest 3d path (b) Side View: Shortest 3d path
(c) Top view: Four different optimal paths
selected by user
(d) Side View: Four different optimal paths
selected by user
Figure 52: Figures (a) and (b) illustrate the shortest path maneuver, figures (c) and
(d) illustrate the optimal path maneuvers.
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Figure 53: Helical Maneuver initiated by Dubins vehicle



















Figure 55: Calculating the point where the two trajectories are concatenated

















Figure 57: Trajectories A and B are of approximately equal length. Trajectory A
was generate by setting θ = 60o and trajectory B was generated by setting θ = 90o
(a) Top view: Vectoring
(yellow trajectory) at 265
knots
(b) Side View: Vectoring
(yellow trajectory) at 265
knots
(c) Top view: Vectoring
(yellow trajectory) at 400
knots
(d) Side View: Vectoring
(yellow trajectory) at 400
knots
Figure 58: Modeling of vectoring for CDA approach at LAX.
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CHAPTER VII
CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 Contributions
• In this work we investigated two different extremal models characterizing dif-
ferent failure mechanisms. The first one, a Loss of Strength (LOS) model where
component strength undergoes degradation when component load reaches a
certain threshold. The component fails when component load is greater than
component strength. After the components fails its load is redistributed to its
neighboring components.
The second one, a Customer Service (CS) model where component demand is
modeled as arriving customers to components and components possess fixed
capacity to service arriving customers. The component demand/capacity inter-
action dictates load sharing with neighboring components. If demand exceeds
capacity and unsuccessful load sharing results in component queue’s being over-
whelmed then the component fails and is removed from the network.
• We implemented both models on lattice and scale-free graph network topologies.
The models exhibits different failure mechanisms depending on the network
topology.
• At critical loads, the LOS model on a lattice network exhibits power-law failure
time distributions. On scale-free graph networks, at critical loads with decreas-
ing network connectivity, the LOS model loses power-law scaling in failure time
distribution. At critical loads, the CS model exhibits exponential failure time
distributions.
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• The LOS model demonstrated greater resilience in scale-free graph network
topologies compared to lattice topologies. For scale-free graph topologies, the
LOS model demonstrated greater resilience with decreasing network connectiv-
ity.
• We established parallels between the SOC signatures of the Bak-Sneppen evolu-
tion model and the CS model. Similar to the Bak-Sneppen model, the CS model
demonstrates punctuated equilibrium in its evolution to the critical state.
• Transition loadings, i.e. tipping points, excite different modes of failure for both
the LOS and CS models. At transition loadings, both models, may or may
not, descend into different scales of failure. Hence, we characterize transition
loadings as ‘tipping-points’ for the systems.
• We described a Markov chain formulation of the CS model. We demonstrated
that the Markov chain formulation agreed with the simulation results for the
CS model.
• We provided a mathematical framework for cascading failure in the LOS model.
We identified the conditions required for triggering, and also for mitigating, cas-
cading failure in the LOS model. This description has potential for mitigating
cascading failure in real systems such as smart grids and power grids.
• We used the LOS model to study creep-rupture phenomena in fiber-matrix
composite structures. We established parallels between our results for the LOS
model creep-rupture framework and the Mahesh and Phoenix creep-rupture
model.
• We provided a framework for studying air traffic congestion management using
the CS model. Specifically we described methods of reformulating aggregate
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flow models for air traffic management in terms of the CS model on a graph
network topology.
• We interpreted metropolitan road traffic congestion using the CS model. Specif-
ically we provided a general description on mapping CS model parameters to
real-world traffic rates and capacities. Using more detailed models developed
based on this description, policy-makers and responsible agencies would be able
to forecast and manage traffic congestion in metropolitan areas of interest.
7.2 Future work
A number of directions for future studies of complex system failure mechanisms are
outlined next.
• In this work we considered networks of relatively small sizes for both lattice and
scale-free graph topologies. A logical next step would be to increase the size of
the network. This would facilitate studies of real networks such as the Internet,
power grids and transportation networks which tend to be large.
• In this work we analyzed the CS model using Markov chain theory. One draw-
back of Markov chain theory is the explosion in state space when considering
large networks. On the other hand, mean-field theory provides a compact but
powerful means to study multi-component systems. Thus modeling the CS
model utilizing mean-field theory is a logical next step.
• In our work we have described, mathematically and in simulations, the cascad-
ing failure property of the LOS model. In electrical power grids, blackouts often
occur when several components (generators) fail simultaneously or in quick suc-
cession thus inducing cascading failure events and ultimately shutting down the
entire system. Thus the LOS model can be potentially used to study cascading
failure events in electrical power grids and smart grids.
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• In our work we have noted the parallels between the failure mechanisms of the
CS model and draw-downs in financial markets. It is worth investigating the
exact nature of the relationship between the CS model and models in financial
applications which demonstrate similar failure patterns.
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